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INTRODUCTION 
Jean-Paul Sartre first appeared on the.French 
literary scene just prior to the war years with the 
publication of his first novel, La Naus~e, in 1938, and 
(1) 
a collection of short stories, under the title Le Mur, 
in 1939. The publication of his major philosophical 
statement, L'Etre et le Neant, in 1943 provoked widespread 
interest and much lively discussion which today, a quarter 
of a century later, is by no means at an end. The name 
of Jean-Paul Sartre will undoubtedly be remembered in 
connection with his interpretation of existential philosophy. 
As a literary man, however, his position is less clear. 
In the realm of the theatre Sartre was accorded a 
wide acclaim in the post-war pe'riod as he canfronted his 
audience with dramatic plays expressing the ideas of his 
philosophy and incorporating aspects of the contemporary 
scene .. If Sartre's literary reputation is to survive the 
test of time and fickle literary tastes, some think it will 
be as a dramatist, not as a novelist. One reason for this 
view is that his interest in the dramatic medium has been 
a more constant one and the theatre has proved a very 
productive outlet for his talents, whereas his novelistic 
achievement has been sporadic, interrupted by the appeals 
of dramatic and philosophical writing. 
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It was not until seven years after the publication of 
La Naus~e that the first two volumes of Lea Chemins de la 
Liberte appeared. Four years later a further V·:)lume was 
published and two chapters of the projected final v~lume, ( 2 ) 
but the intended four-novel cycle remains unfinished fJr 
slnce 1949 Sartre has abandoned the fictional genre entirely 
and at this stage it appears that he will not return to it. 
But, as Maurice Cranst'Jn points ')ut, (3) one should n'Jt 
neglect Sartre's fiction although hie interest has since 
extended more to other fields. 
A study such as this must necessarily find itself 
restricted in scope. It would be impossible tJ attempt 
anything like a c )mplete discussion of the many facets 
Jf Sartre 'a career for his wr.J. tinge have been prJlific and 
include phi los<Jphica 1 and politic a 1 essays, literary 
criticism, theatre, and fiction - vastly differing fields 
but all basically united by the powerful intellect and 
verbal talent of their author who has provided such a mass 
of complications and paradoxes for critics t:> p:)nder. I 
have therefore chosen to discuss only the fJur novels 
although this f'Jrms a relatively small pr:::>p)rtian 1Jf 
Sartre 's interests as a writer and thinker. It is not my 
intenticm tJ discuss Sartre 's ideas as they are stated in 
his theoretical writings, n:>r to contest the validity of 
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the last nineteen years or so, is m~re Jf an advantage than 
a disadvantage in that it allows the criticllll to c·::>nsider the 
four novels as the sum total ':Jf hie activity in this genre. 
Although this constitutes but one aspect of his work, and 
is incomplete at that, I believe that Sartre profited from 
this .. tentative manquee" as it were, and that his readers 
and critics may well d) likewise. 
The "roman e:xiatentieltt has come to be acknowledged 
almost as a distinct genre. Simone de Beauvoir•, in her 
artie le "Li tteratu:re et Meta physique", ( 4) describes h')w, 
by seeking to capture metaphysical reality in the dramatic 
m')ment of experience, existentialism often finds its 
medium ::;f expression in fiction. As a leading figure of 
the existentialist scho:ll, Sartre's contribution to the 
existential novel is significant and La Nauaee may be 
considered as the prototype of this kind of novel, reveal-
ing as it does the maj:>r issues of Sartre 's existential 
philos'Jphy. 
But alth')ugh this work appeared in 1938, curiously 
enJugh the term "existentialist" did not c:Jme into vogue 
until about 19~3 when it started to be used as a convenient 
appellation for Sartre and his f')ll:Jwers. The sub-title 
Jf L'Etre et le N6ant$ (5) clearly indicates that Sartre 
thaught of himself primarily as a phenomenolJgist but he 
resigned himself to accepting the label "existentialisttt 
conferred upon him by others and so~n came to use the word 
himself. 
Simone de Beauvoir entitled her b::>ok on existential 
ethics The Ethics ':Jf Ambiguiti'• (6 ) Paradox and ambiguity 
are central to existentialist thinking and the philosophers 
-:Jf' this sch:Jol recognize this even in accepting the 
adJective "existentialiste" which has largely replaced 
Kierkegaard 'a original usage "existentielle". A certain 
rapport is maintained )f course but Kierkegaard held that 
it was only in subJectivity that man could grasp existence 
and therefore he was opposed tJ systematized philosophy and 
did not develop his own doctrine as such. Sartre, like 
Heidegger, can not be called truly "existential" in this 
sense, since he did develop a formal doctrine in 
L 'Etre et le N~ant. However, a literary appr,::>ach can 
pr'Wide the sort of subJective immediacy which is truly 
"existentielleu and Sartre's fiction must therefore be 
considered as an independent expression of his ideas, not 
as a mere appendage to the philosophy f::>rmulated in his 
theoretical works. Sartre himself has emphasized thi 
pDint in an interview tdth Madeleine Chapsal, (7) 
encouraging his readers t-J seek in his fiction views ::m 
ethics and human relationships which are nJt necessarily 
included in his philosophical writings. 
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The publicati~n of the autobiographical Lea Mots in 
1964 produced Sartre 'a own opini'.ms of his past achievement 
in his literary activities and his forthright testimony sa 
tJ the changes in his attitude towards hie writing as his 
career developed proved somewhat disconcerting. 
"J'ai change' ••• " he said (M p.209). and the more hostile 
:>f his critics were quick t) seize upon this passage in 
particular as an admissi:m of' failure and disaatisfacti)n 
with his former literary beliefs. However, in a subsequent 
article in Le Monda, Sartre replies to his critics, 
declaring that he does not reject any of his writings but 
does not consider them to be of equal value. Nor does 
his later development in his attitude towards literature 
invalidate former "illusions" which none the leas were 
sincerely held beliefs at the time. ttJe ne me aula pas 
deseapere et ne renie pas mon ceuvre anterienre," he states .. 
Sartre has aroused widespread interest, gathered a 
strong following of disciples, and provoked much critical 
antag::>niam. As a writer and thinker he is a c ')mplex 
phenomen;)n and, as migh be expected, hi.s a ttl tudes are not 
definitive but flexible, for lack of fixity is a central 
tenet of his thought. But the resulting ambiguities and 
paradoxes have provided many a headache for critics seeking 
consistency. So much contradictory criticism baa been 
( 8) 
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written about Sartre's novels that t~day, nearly twenty 
years after the publication of his last novel, the subject 
is still by no means exhausted nor the controversies 
resolved. Sartre's novels will no doubt continue to be 
assessed and re-assessed for some time to come. 
It was precisely this body of conflicting interpreta-
tions which motivated me to attempt my own closer examination 
of the novels. Therefore the opinions expressed in this 
study are in part subjective, but also, I hope, sufficiently 
objective in so far as, in order to have some basis of 
justification for my judgement, I have not only scrutinised 
the novels themselves, but have also tried to read a range 
of differing critical interpretations of both the literature 
and philosophy of Sartre. A selection ~f the books which 
I f~und moat helpful and stimulating in this respect is 
included in the bibliography. 
In attempting a critical appraisal of the novels my 
method has been straightforward. I begin with a general 
introductory chapter in which I try to place Sartre in the 
perspective of his time - a necessary preliminary, I feel, 
since he is a writer deeply concerned with his contemporary 
period and whose work reflects this. Having done this, l 
shall proceed to examine each of the novels in turn, 
chronologically, to extract from them the fictional 
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illustrations of the themes Jf his philosophy. 
It will be noticed that the first two novels are 
dealt with at greater length. The reason for this is that 
I believe they are the more successful 'Jf his nnvels from 
a literary point of view. Also both are complete in 
themselves, in spite of the fact that L'Age de Raison is 
the first of a aeries. The second jf this series, 
Le Sursia, requires a knJwledge of the characters of the 
flrat unless it is to seem Jverwhelmingly bewildering, 
especially as the stylistic technique which Sartre adopts 
is itself inclined to confuse the reader. At first the 
"simultaneous" technique is promising. It is dynamic 
and appropriate t:) the theme and atm:>sphere which Sartre 
wishes to convey but towards the end it does become rather 
tiresome .. Perhaps Sartre found it so too, for in the 
third volume Sartr•e returns to his accustomed style. 
Structurally, h·Jwever, the novel is leas satisfying than 
his previous work. This again· may indicate that he is 
beginning to weary of the tetralogy which he baa begun 
and left unfinished. 
In a further chapter I shall consider Lea Chemins 
de la Libert6 as a aeries., l:J::>king briefly at the two 
chapters of what was to have been the final VJlume of the 
tetralogy. t)gether with the outline for the rest ?f that 
I shall discuss the problems raised by ita central 
theme of freedom and whether or not the apparent impasse 
which it reaches and Sartre's abandonment of the sequence 
is indeed indicative of a "literature of despair" as has 
sometimes been claimed. 
In the final chapter I shall turn again from the 
particular to the general to consider the validity of a 
"11tt6rature philoaophique" since this is the objection 
perhaps most frequently raised by critics in connection 
with Sartre's novels. 
CHAPTER 1. 
THE AUTHOR AND HIS AGE 
Every age inevitably projects its own image ot man 
and his world into its art and letters and many have been 
the accusations against a certain section of the novels 
of this century ~r comprising a literature ~r despair and 
pessimism. If such .an apparently pessimistic attitude 
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by so many intelligent writers, including Jean-Paul Sartre, 
has become e prevalent feature of a proportion of French 
literature of the twentieth century, this must surely be 
attributable in part to the difficulties and insecurities 
of the times. Sartre's "point de de'part" in his novels, 
as elsewhere, is undeniably just such an attitude of 
disillusionment and an almost obsessive sense, shared by 
many others since the disenchanted period during and 
following the first World War, of the apparent futility of 
life itself. 
Some critics have attempted t~ discredit existentialism 
by claiming that it was merely a part of the after-math or 
the Second World War and France's guilty conscience since 
the Spanish Civil War. This slighting attitude is an 
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injustice to existential philosophy. It is only to be 
expected that post-war Europe should have evolved an 
anguished philosophy incorporating its recent experience 
when other faiths could not account for the tragedies and 
horrors of war and the insecurity of society and the 
ind1 vidual. But, in retrospect, it is evident that 
existentialism was not the result or World war 11 alone, 
alth·:)ugh this is certainly a factor in the more general 
20th century 'malaise• t) which Sartre's existentialism 
gives expression. However, much of existential phil:)aophy 
is derived from the nineteenth century philosophers, 
Kierkagaard and Nietzsche, and a large proportion of what 
is most original in Sartre's thinking was already present 
in his first novel, La Naua~e, which was published in 1938. 
Certainly French existentialism, with its ethics of 
desperate heroism and anguished responsibility, found a 
ready public during the war years and the time ·:>f the 
Occupation when life was insecure and precarious. The 
normal s~cial organisation was in a state of upheaval 
and a new code or values had to emerge. 
In the years after the end c>f the war, Sartre •a ideas, 
as he incarnated them in the dramatic characters Qf his 
plays and novels, were to find a pred:>minantly youthful 
audience and provide a fulfilment of sorts to the needs :>f 
a young generation whose minds had been shocked by the 
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horrors of war and bewildered by the apparent absurdity and 
futility of life. 
On this point too existentialism has suffered derogatory 
treatment. For many people during these years. particularly 
the American public it seems, existentialism became 
ass>Jciated with a bohemian cult ::>f t>~ould-be intellectuals 
/ 
who seemed to spend their lives frequenting Paris cafes. 
It would be ridiculous to suggest that there was no basis 
f'or this impression, that French existential philosophy 
does not have an element >Jf the sensational and the morbid. 
Undoubtably the new philosophy had a certain attraction 
f'or this type, but the attraction was superficial for 
beyond the apparently nihilistic pessimism of his existential 
th:mght, rtre offers the uncompromising, moralistic 
teaching ::>f the need for maturity and responsibility on 
the part of the individual in order• to bring about a change 
for the 'better• in s:Jciety. He demands a resolute and 
sincere courage to reach for the hope which lies beyond 
despair. 
But just how is it that man's situation in this 
century has bec:>me so desperate that some of France's most 
talented writers, including Malraux. Bernanos and Celine, 
have felt ')bliged to depict in their fictional work a 
brutalized image of man in an absurd, illogical universe. 
It seems that from the early years ~f the century multiple 
forces have been at work which tend to disintegration of 
human dignity. Political and social events, and the 
sometimes frightening progress ::Jf science, have CJmbined 
to destroy or considerably undermine traditional humanist 
Jr religious concepts. 
On the spiritual level western civilization has been 
undergoing a pr:)cesa of increasing secularization. Man 
has become inevitably more c·:mcemed with the materialistic 
here-and-now of this life than with the goal of a 
transcendental reality beyond this world. 
On the histories 1 level, the outbreak :>f war in 191 ~· 
abruptly shattered any illusion of a secure, progressive 
humanity. The bourgeois was rudely stripped of the 
shelter of his stable social environment and could take no 
comfort in his former humanist philosophy. 
Financial depression, unemployment, the rise of Mussolini 
in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and the impending threat of 
another war were to put an end to the nascent optimism of 
the decade following the end ::>f World War 1. The writers 
emerging in the thirties, Malraux, Bernanos, st. Exupery. 
inevitably became more concerned with the c::>ntemporary 
scene. With the Spanish Civil war and the defeat and 
occupation of France in World War 11, literature became 
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closely linked to the historical situation. War and 
revoluti'Jn became one 'Jf the creative stimuli in thought 
and literature, producing a spate of novels with this as 
their theme. If existential literature depicts absurdity 
it is because contemporary events have accentuated this 
with the brutal horrors Jf war. Unlike Monterlant tor 
instance, not all contemporary writers felt able to ignore 
this state of affairs. 
Paralleling these historical events was the social and 
political phenomenon of the growing influence of leftist 
ideologies which further undermined what was left of 
"b"urgeois" values by placing the emphasis :m the proletariat 
as the rising force in society and stating the capitalist 
centred structure of society. The boutgeoisie was ~)b11ged 
to see its image of the social order crumble and existential 
philosophy may be seen as the product of a b:>urge::>is society 
in a state of dissolution in so far as the individual, no 
longer able tJ rely on his social identity, has had to come 
to terms with himself. 
Modern man is a \IJitness t·o violence, evil, insecurity, 
and the apparent collapse of human values, and these are 
the anxious problems for which western civilization must 
seek answers. Existentialism embodies the self-questiJning 
of an age where man is despera ly trying to re-orient 
himself. 
15 .. 
Existential philosophy encourages individuals t-:> struggle 
with the possibilities for an authentic and genuine life in 
~ppositi~n to the threat of the demand for conf~rmity by the 
tendency toward a standardized, depersonalized society. 
The themes of existential literature - the alienation of 
the individual and his estrangement frJm his fellow beings, 
the sense ::>f the fundamental futility and precariousness 
of human existence, the threat of nothingness and death, 
are problems derived from the historical situation. But 
the truths so bitterly taught by the events of the war 
years and post-war period are not necessarily only local 
or exceptional truths and the existential writers and 
thinkers have afforded phil?sophical insights of enduring 
and universal value. Existentialism certainly originated 
from the historical mood of Europe since it was Europe 
which experienced crisis and European thinkers who gave 
expression to this philosophy, but the significance of 
existentialism is far-reaching. It is not the philosophy 
only of twentieth century Europe but has a general application 
for our troubled age. 
If' we turn t::> examine the literature ::>f this century 
we find that the general "malaise" of the age is reflected 
there. Testifying to the general breakdown of an 
established moral and intellectual order, novels of 
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disquiet reflect an ''age of anxiety" • Of course, by no 
means all novels come within this category. One has only to 
recall the pantheistic novels of the earlier Giono, the 
charm and simplicity of Bosco's characters and settings, and 
the intensely religious writing of a Catholic auth:~r lik:e 
Mauriac, ta rea lise that the n::lVe ls "Jf anxiety are but ::me 
aspect of the broader literary scene. 
Nevertheless, the disintegration <>f a classical, 
humanistic concept of man is one emergent feature of the 
twentieth century novel. The display of man's inhumanity to 
man in World War 1 remained deeply engraved in the minds of 
some post•war writers. \!lith the advent ::>f Freud and the 
science of psycho-ana lysis the former c:mception of 
personality crumbled still further as man was stripped 
of his surface veneer to expose the base primitive instincts 
which were his motivating forces. The cult of the morbid, 
violent, and abnormal in literature was advanced by the 
influence ·::>f Franz Kafka and his portrayal of the terror 
and bewilderment of the character in an illogical, absurd, 
nightmarish world. For a time the violent and aggressive 
American n::wels, particularly th::>se of Hemingway and 
Falkner, enjoyed popular vogue in France and influenced 
some French writers in the 1930's .• 
From the 1930's onward a proportion of French novels 
have given an unfavourable picture of human nature, 
continuing to diminish the human image with their pre-
occupati:m in describing man's humiliation in the grip 
of his baseness. c$line's Vo~ase au bout de la Nuit (1 ) 
is one such novel. There seems to be little of human 
dignity or heroism in the brutal image which the novels 
present and which coincides with a similar brutalization 
and demoralization of humanity by the crises of tw::> world 
ward and an uneasy "peace". That man had been harshly 
thrust into a situation of horror where society was no 
longer stable nor comforting, and neither was its literature, 
is witnessed by the fundamental pessimism which pervades 
the work of a writer such ae Anouilh. 
Previous moral values had lost their significance 
and were no longer applicable in such a metamorphosed 
society. Such are the dilemmas 'Jf the human c:mdition 
which the writings of the existentialists reflect. Sartre 
reacts with "nausea" to the superfluity and arbitrariness 
of the physical world and man's relation to it. He 
attacks most of his potential readers in his scathing 
portrays ls of the ''sa laud" type of character, and in his 
onslaught against the no longer relevant standards of a 
bourgeois SJciety and traditional humanist values. Deprived 
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of all social veneer the character is reduced to a primitive 
visc·::>sity and "1 'homme absurde" 'Jf existential literature is 
revealed as no more than an emptiness or V::>id. This is 
1:>bviously a violently anti-literacy attitude and one 
wonders if such an attitude can lead t:> anywhere but an 
impasse. 
The tJrm or the novel has undergone considerable 
change too this century. True_ the novel is one literary 
genre which has never known the restraint of a system or 
theory and rules. However, certain traditional c :mcepta 
have developed with regard to the basic techniques or the 
novelist's art in handling plot, character, situation and 
so on. But today it appears that the plot of a novel 
now matters less than t rme:rly. Not infrequently the 
development )f events is already evident from the outset,. 
particularly if the auth;:>r chooses to work .back from the 
present to a reminiscence of past events, as Sart:re d·::>ea in 
Le Sursis f:>r instance. · Far more important than plot is 
the matter ::>f how the characters react under the impact of 
changing events and character reaction has become a primary 
c·:mcern of novelists. Part of the reason for this may be 
that with~ut a stable social reality to which characters 
may be directly related, the emphasis focuses to a greater 
extent on the individual c:>nsciousness. This, coupled vdth 
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the psycho-analytic preoccupations of the age, has caused 
the novel to assume a more introspective form~ One of 
the practical results of this 1a that a novel, such as 
La Nausee, may limit its scope to an examination in depth Jr 
a single consciousness in its continuous state of flux. 
The same applies to Camus • L 'Etrange:r, ( 2 ) where the 
attention is focused entirely on Meursault, the absurd 
hero par excellence. 
The metaphysical nature of the novel has always been 
tacitly implied in as much as the author's interpretation 
::>f reality is visible in his creati')n o:f a ficti::mal 
w,orld and characters and his novels will reflect his moral 
conceptions of life. This century, hJwever, the novel's 
metaphysical tendencies have ceased to be sublimated and 
have become explicit. Writers have become acutely self-
conscious and recent generations or novelists particularly 
have been concerned to awaken their reader from their social 
and moral complacency to recognise their bad conscience 
and neglected responsibility. Novels ruthlessly analyse 
individuals in order to elicit a new scrutiny and re-
assessment of the s~cial conscience. 
With literature increasingly reflecting contemporary 
problems and uncertainties many writers began to show their 
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phil~sophical ~r political affiliations directly in their 
fictional work. Since Malraux~ it has come to be expected 
of novelists, and in particular those of the existential 
school, that their work should investigate the difficulties 
of authentic being, of assuming one's freedom and responsi· 
bility, 'Jf discove:x•ing valid standards in a life c:matantly 
threatened by "Nothingness". Some critics have expressed 
the opinion~ and not without a measure of justificatiJn, that 
the novel begins its decline as a literary genre when it 
becomes concerned with social and metaphysical considerations 
almost to the point of excluding certain traditional aesthetic 
concepts. It may thus degenerate into what Camus terms 
"une li tterature de la propagande". 
Victor Brombert, (3) sees the modern French novel as 
having been over-run by intellectuals and the experiences 
recounted in fictional form are not depicted by the actions 
and emotions of the char•acters but via the mental reactions 
of the protagonists. The existential novel especially 
seems to have become the natural abode of the "intellectual 
hero" who is given to constantly ana lysing himself', his 
surroundings, and his anguished situation in an absurd world. 
Br:>mbert sees the reason for this prep:mderance of intellectual 
characters partly in the fact that scholars, teachers and 
even professional philosophers 6 have tumed to writing novels~ 
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But the primary fact~r is the fundamental appeal which a 
"litterature d 'ide'es" has for the French mind. In 
French literature generally ideological and philosophical 
themes are readily translated intJ dramatic forces and 
Brombert notes that Gustave Lanson 1n the Avant-Propos to 
LtHistoire de la Litt~rature Francaise states that: 
"La litterature est, dans le plus noble sens (4) du mot, une vulgarisati·:>n de la philos~.)phie." 
The novel as the medium not of story-tellers, but of 
moralists, aims to increase the readers awareness and 
understanding of a concept of reality and to encourage him, 
despite the apparent bleakness of his situation, to 
formulate the values necessary to give a meaning to his 
existence. Sartre states the passi4'1late intensity ::;f 
metaphysical literature in "Qu'est ce que la litterature?" 
thus: 
111a metaphysique n'est pas une discussion 
sterile sur des notions abstraites qui 
6chappent ~ l'experience, c'est un effort 
vivant pour embrasaer du dedans la condition 
humaine dans sa totalite. n (5) 
The nove 1 is n·.)t a mere vehicle for philosophies 1 
reflections but has reached the stage where the philosophy 
itself has become a dramatic f::>rce in the novel. Pr:>blems 
are not presented as a spectacle but as an experience in 
which the reader is directly involved. 
It is a significant literary phenomenon that such 
novels have become intellectualized to the extent or 
bec·::>ming a transposition into fictional themes of the 
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anguished self-questioning of man in this era. Sartre 's 
n:>vela and plays are deliberately laden with the 
intellectual anguish which he considers the truest exprea-
sion -Jf the age. He believes that a writer should 
tolreatle with the problems which beset man in his own time 
and environment. and this is what he attempts. 
particularly in his later fiction. His writing must have 
va lid1 ty primarily for his c :mtemporaries since it appears 
that the writer of today has become the keeper of the 
social conscience, responsible not only to himself and to 
his art, but also t·o his public. It is sartre 'a contention 
that literature should naturally be "committed"; that isJJ 
it should try to ev:>ke a choice for• commitment on the part 
of the reader by revealing the reality of the human 
condition in the hope of finding an answer to contemporary 
social problems. 
On the Jthez• hand, sartre is by n0 means suggesting 
that literature should be judged by its purely utilitarian 
value of prov:Jk:ing m:Jral reform since this would reduce the 
novel to the level of a propagandist tract. What he does 
want is that the language or prose literature be used as a 
means of real communication, not merely as an everyday 
functional tool nor as a weapon of propaganda. He does 
not extend this role to the more "aesthetic" fDrms of 
music, painting, or poetry where words are rightly 
symbols and objects in themselves rather than communicatives. 
But Sartre's central concept of literary commitment, 
which is intellectual in approach, as one might expect, is 
closely bound to his philosophic concepts regarding freedom. 
For him literature is a mode of action. It is the act of 
a writer's freedom appealing to the freedom of other 
individuals in inviting them t> "prendre conscience", to 
recognise and accept their human situation. In 9u'est ce 
gue la litt,rature? he explains that literature is the act 
by which the writer, exercising his freedom, appeals to 
other individuals to respond, and subsequently commends the 
cause of freedom for all mankind. In Existentialisme est 
un humanisme, (h) he further clarifies the link between 
freedom and commitment. Individual freedom depends on the 
exercise of choice and when a man chooses he is creating a 
value not only for• himself but for all others since "tout 
est responaable de tout devant tous". He is thus committed 
to will the freedom o·f the collective body at the same time 
as he wills his individual freed~m. This is the m?rality 
of freedom and responsibility which Sartre advocates and of 
which the "engagement" of the author is one aspect. 
Commitment in literature is an extension of the writer's 
responsibility to arouse in· his readers a commitment on their 
own behalf to a morality which will invest existence with 
meaning. As Sartre originally intended it, the phrase 
"committed l:tteraturen referred to literature committed t:J 
any genuinely moral view of life whatever. But since 1949 
Sartre has become increasingly concerned with p~litical 
and social issues and "litterature engagee" has assumed 
conn::;tations or "literatt1ve committed to socialism" when 
used by s:)me critics. True, much of his later work 
especially lends sufficient supp·ort for such an interpre-
tation but it was never Sartre 's intention to advocate 
that a committed writer should align himself with a 
particular party and use literature as a weapon in a 
revolutionary cause or in the class war. He has clearly 
stated: 
"La 11 tterature engagee n 'est pas une li tte'rature 
de militant". (7) 
Obviously there must be pitfalls inherent in the 
c~ncept ~r literary commitment which forma both a strength 
and a weakness in Sartre's w~rk. Ambiguities and 
c ::mtradicti:::me arise which are bound to lead to a degree ·:>f' 
literary disillusionment. In an interview v-Jith Madeleine 
Chapsal in 19(0, Sartre confesses having loat some or his 
earlier literary illusions. 
nMy first books", he says, 0 ••• weren't directly 
inV:llved with social problema. Then came the 
::>ccupation. We began to think that action V.Jss 
necessary. After the war we thought that books, 
articles etc. could serve usefully. They didn't 
dJ anything at all. Later ••••• I thought books 
pondered over and written out without any concern 
with immediate pertinence, might help in the long 
run. Well even that d·:~esn 't serve any useful 
purpose. That's not how you go about havin~ 
influence on people; you find that what y::>u ve 
thought and felt just gets deformed.n (8) 
In spite of this, however, he still believes that the 
motivation of tbe wr•iter is: "to bear wi tnesa t:> their 
times to their lives; they want to be, above all else, 
their own witnesses." (9) 
The diff'icul ty 'Jf the the<Jry and practice ·Jf a 
committed phil<Jsophic literature is, as Miss Murdoch 
notes in her book Sartre, Romantic Rationalittt, (1o) that 
the appeal of Sartre's novels, being problematic and 
analytical, does depend largely <Jn our being initially moved 
by the intellectual conflicts with which they deal. 
CHAPTER II 
LJ.\ NAUSEE 
ttc'est un garcon sane imp~rtance collective, 
c'est tout Juste un individu." 
This quotation from Cel!ne with which Sartre prefaces 
La Naueee provides a significant key to the understanding 
of its "hero", Antoine Roquentin, the epitome of the 
lJnely man, isolated in solitude from the rest ~f his 
fellow men. 
We are t )ld that this book is his dis ry, disc::>vered 
among his papers after his death. Such a method ')f 
intimate presentation permits the author t J i.nstall 
himself in the consciousness ?f the b'Jok's single charactet•, 
a very dull man living a very dull life until the day he 
experiences the metaphysical vertigo which inspires him to 
''tenir un journal pour y v::>ir clair." 
We are also told that he has travelled extensively as 
an archaeologist-historian, although it is a little 
difficult to reconcile this past life of action with the 
inactivity and boredom of his life over the last three 
years in Bouville where he has settled in ·Jrder to have 
access to certain documents in the municipal library to 
assist him in his research int::> the life of M. de Rollebon 
whose biography he is writing. 
He has been separated for four years from his ex-
mistress. Anny, who was perhaps the only person who ever 
meant anything to him. Few other people are mentioned 
in the book and since Roquentin's acquaintance with them 
is but superficial the readerta knowledge of them is 
sketchy. Apart from these few casual acquaintances, 
Roquentin is aLJne in Bouville, a stranger am::>ng its 
citizens. 
uMoi je vis seul. entierement aeul. Je ne 
parle a personne, jamais; Je ne recois rien, je ne donne rien. L'Autodidacte ne compte 
r.as. Il y a bien Fran!!oise, la patronne du 
'Rendez-vous des Chemin:>ta. •• Mais est-ce 
que je lui parle?" (N. p.18) 
He sleeps with the cafe proprietress but feels no affection 
or even desire for her. The few acquaintances he has made 
in Douville ignite no spark of human companionship in him, 
no wish for communication. 
The loneliness of Roquentin and his isolation are 
extreme but it does not trouble him unduly - in fact he 
seems quite proud of it. A somewhat disillusioned and 
unenthusiastic historian wh~ has long forgotten any reas~n 
he might have had for undertaking to write N. de Rollebon's 
biography, he passes each day in dreary boredom and inner 
solitude within the confines of his hotel room, the library, 
or a cafe. No friendship brightens his drab exiatance for 
he feels far removed from the people around him. Their 
personalities, thoughts, and feelings have little meaning 
or interest for him. A completely detached observer, he 
sees Jthers from without and as if from a distance, a 
sensatiJn similar to looking down from his hotel window 
at the people in the square below. 
Roquentin is c )mpletely "de racine". At thirty years 
of age he has nc, Job since his private income, though 
modest, is sufficient for his needs. He has reJected 
his past way of life, has no family, no friends, no 
responsibilities. In additi>Jn to being independent in personal 
matters, Roquentin is also independent ::>f' the rest of s()ciety. 
He has no sense of himself as a social being. Francis 
Jeanson points out that as the diary was ostensibly written 
in 1932, during that period before the imminence of war 
became fully apparent when any collective conflicts "were 
dividing French S'.)Ciety only in a dull wayn, (1 ) it is 
hardly surprising that Roquentin should be so apathetic 
towards social matters. He is quite "degage'" and 1 t is 
precisely because he has no sense or collectivity, because 
he is not personally engaged in any social issues, that 
Roquentin is able to preserve the role of being an 
onlooker set apart from the rest of society. 
In the most literal sense therefore he may seem to 
be completely "free" but his independence is a mockery 
of real freedom as Sartre understands it and affords him 
no happiness. The original title intended for the book 
was Melancholia and Roquentin'a whole outlook on life is 
decidedly melancholic. Since solitude is not a natural 
state he is bored and dissatisfied. The metaphysical 
experience which overwhelms him is a highly individual 
one, possible only because he is such an isolated con-
sciousness and therefore the more susceptible to discovering 
the absurdity of existence in attacks of what John 
Weightman, (2 ) terms "c:mtingency-a!ckneas." 
In her chapter from Lea Sandalea d'Em~6aocle entitled 
"sartre ou la dupllcite de 1 'Stre: Aacese et Mythomaniett, 
Claude-Edmonde Magny (:~) c·:>nc ludes that extreme alienation 
is necessary if one is to experience the revelation )f 
certain aspects of reality in the way Roquentin does. 
Therefore Roquentin chooses an attitude of "tricherie", 
as Magny calla it, - "tricherie" because the initial ch~ice 
~r such an attitude must be "deliberate, 9willeo', and 
therefore auspectn, but the word is not intended pejoratively. 
This "cheating" involves a rejection of the wh:::>le set of 
defence mechanisms which nortnally.protect one fr'm being 
invaded by symptoms of nausea and anxiety. But in 
Sartre•s view such sympto:ms are intimations of metaphysical 
reality and the social concepts which we acknowledge 
present a barrier to the understanding of the profound 
reality \>Jhich lies behind them so the "cheater's" social 
frameiPJOrk must be destroyed, leaving him vdthout the 
defence of his integration in a family, a circle of friends, 
and a profession. 
It is als~ necessary that he should reject his past. 
In Malraux's La Vole Royale, (4 ) Claude Vannec had turned 
his back on fixed modes of living and found in a life ::>f 
travel and adventure a justification for existence. 
Roquentin too had travelled in foreign parts, living a 
similar sort of life, but he rejects the daemon of 
adventure since it is a f0rm of self-deception or mythomania 
tJ c:msider one's life as a series of adventures when 
actually it is <Jnly a disconnected sequence of gratuitous 
events J.rlhich only in :retrospect can be invested with the 
significance <Jf "adventures". 
"Je n •at pas eu d 'aventu.res. Il m'est arrive" 
des hist)i:res, des evenements, des incidents, 
tout ce qu'on voudra. Mais pas des aventures ••• 
Des sventu:res sont dans les liv:res. '' (N. pp.54-55) 
As a man \dth no past therefore, Roquentin clings t0 the 
present and ,the intensity and uniqueness of each moment. 
The rejection ')f social relationships and his past 
way of life are the physical means of alienation but a 
mental alienation is also necessary. Magny describes 
this as a rejection of the concept of a lucid personality, a 
renunciati::m ::Jf the "I". When this has been accomplished 
each thought exists of its own accord since, theoretically, 
there is no longer any agent to create the thought. 
"A present., quand Je dis 'Je'~ game semble 
creux. Je n'arrive plus tree bien a me 
sentir, tellement je suis oubli6'. Tout ce 
qui reate de reel, en mol, c•est de l'existence 
qui se sent exister. Je oaille doucement, 
longuement.. Pers,Jnne. Pour personne, 
Antoine Roquentin n'existe. Qa m'amuse. Et 
qu'est-ce ~ue c'est que ga, Antoine Roquentin? 
c•est de l abstrait. Unpile petit souvenir 
de moi vscille dans ma conscience. Antoine 
Roquentin.... Et soudain le je palit et a 'en 
est fait, il s'eteint. 
Lucida, immobile, deserte, la conscience est 
posee entre lee murs; elle se perpetue. 
Personna ne l*habite plus. Tout~ l'heure encore 
quelqu'un disait m~i, disait ma conscience. Qui? ( •••• ) La conscience existe-comme un arbre, 
c::::>mme un brin d 'herbe. Elle somnole, ella 
s)ennuie. De peti tea existences fugi ti vee la 
peuplent c ::>mme des o!.sef;)ux dans les branches .. 
La peuplent et disparaissent .. " (N. p.2121) 
Such depersonalization and the destruction of all 
social elements are not undertaken simply for their own 
sake of course, but are Justified since they make 
revelation possible. Only when divested of the social 
integration of his life and th~ught, having freed himself 
from his dependence on :>there and entered the soli tacy 
c?ntinea of his own depths. can Roquentin see things in a 
way which the "salauds" can not. 
Because he feels "different" from the others, 
Roquentin has a sense of superiority 'JVer the people he 
sees around him and it is precisely because he is so 
totally alien to this circle that he can analyse, harshly 
and sarcastically, the pettiness of Bouville'a inhabitants. 
On a sunday morning walk through the streets of Bouville 
he watches, detached and aloof, the parade of an·::>nymous 
beings each conforming to the pattern Jf behaviour expected 
of him. This episode is a brilliant evocation of the 
rigidity of the Bouvillois as they all too readily assume 
the steri·::>typed manner•iama of the roles which they are 
exp~cted to play. 
"sur l'autre trottoir, un monsieur, qui tient 
sa femme par le bras, vient de lui glisser 
quelqu.es mots a l'oreille et a 'est mis )J 
sourire. Aussit~t, elle d~pouille soigneu-
eement de toute expression sa. face~ cre'meuae et 
fait quelques pas en aveugle. Ces signee ne 
trompent vas: ils vont saluer. En effetD 
au bout d un instant, le monsieur Jette sa main 
en l'air. Quand sea doigts sont ~ proximit6 
de son feutre, ils hesitent une seconde avant 
de se poser dE(lic:atement sur la coit'fe. 
Pendant qu'il soul.ve doucement son chapeau, 
en baissant un peu la tete pour aider a 
1•extraction, sa femme fait un petit saut 
en 1nscrivant sur son visalfe un sourire Jeune. 
Une ombre lea depasse en s inclinant: mais 
leurs deux sourires Jumeaux ne e'ettacent pas 
sur-le-ohamps ils demeurent quelques instants 
sur leurs levres, par une espece de r~manence. 
Quane le monsieur et la dame me croisent, ils 
ont repris leur 1mpassib1lite, mais il leur " 
reste encore un air gai autour de la bouche. (N. pp.64-5) 
Their automatic reflexes and concern with social 
trivialities show how wrapt they are in playing their 
I''Jles of existing only for others. 
According to Sartre, such Being-for-Others is a 
cowardly attempt of the consciousness to avoid the 
anguishing quest for Self-coincidence, Rather than face its 
own inter1or emptiness the consciousness looks for a 
confirmation of its being in other consciousnesses by 
urging. others to con form t·:> certain roles in (>rder that 
they may seem a stable :r:•ef'lection of itself and therefore 
affirm for it an illusory solidity. Such wishes to exist, 
not in oneself, but in the lo.,k of others, in social 
considerations, in the accumulation :>f' material possessions, 
are all manifestations of "mauvaiae foi", vain deceptions 
which make of man a "passion inutile'•. 
Instead of recognising the nauseating gratuitousness 
of existence and the anguish it brings the "salaudn 
prefers to remain in comfortable conformity, accepting 
conventional social values as absolutes. Thus the 
typical b::.>u:rgeois "salaud" conceals his ::>wn situation by 
enveloping himself in his honour, morality. and social 
importance, Examining the portraits of the city fathers 
in the local museum Roquentin indulges in a fierce attack 
on these uswineu who with their money and respectability 
have made class assumptions their abs::>lute. They 
believe they have found their niche in the social scale 
and occupy it with a clear conscience having blended 
themselves to the human condition. But equally at fault 
are those wh' unquestioningly accept the established 
social :Jrder, content to identify themselves with their 
social function, however lowly, thereby assuming the 
fixed r:Jle conferred on them by C>thers .. 
The "salaudsn are those unthinking beings who ere 
ign?rent of the need to discover a meaning for existence 
since they already believe that they have f·:>Und their 
justification in the morality of convention. But 
Roquentin sets himself apart fr•om the mob. 
"Adieu beaux lis tout en finesse 
sanctuaires paints, adieu beaux 
?rgeuil et notre rais<:m d ·~tre o 
dans vos petits 
lis, notre 
Adieu sa laude." 
(N. p.122) 
In ac·orning convention and conformity, he finds himself 
alone with his consciousness. The bourgeois reacti)nary 
never achieves this state of inner vision as he either 
has not experienced Roquentin's metaphysical nausea or 
else has suppressed it. 
Sartre does not intend us to think of Roquentin's 
experience as exceptional or abnormal. He believes such 
"nausea" belongs wi1fhin the experience of everyone since 
the measure of man's hum,nity is, for Sartre, that he 
lucidly accepts the anguish of his condition and explores 
it to its limit. The value of "nausea" is that it reveals 
a true awareness of the fundamental absurdity and 
contingency of existence and those who would evade this 
tragic issue by constructing a screen of illusions to 
protect themselves are guilty of self-deception. 
"Exister, c 'est ·~tre 1'8, simplement; ••••• Il y 
a des gens, Je crois, qui ont c·;,mpris ca. 
Seulement ils ont essaye de surmonter cette 
contingence en inventant un etre n~cessaire 
et cause de soi. Or aucun etre necessaire ne 
peut expliquer l'existence, La contingence •••• 
o'est l 1absolu, par consequent la gratuit~ 
parfaite. Tout est gratuit, ce Jardin~ cette 
ville et moi-m~me. Quand il arrive qu'on 
s 'en rende compte, ga vous tourne le c ce ur et 
tout se met a flotter, comme l'autre soir, au 
"Rendez-Vous des Cheminots 11 : voi;J.a la Nausee; 
' voila ce que lee salauds ••••• essaient de se 
cacher avec leur idee de droit." (N. p.166) 
This wilful suppression <Jf' awareness is termed 
"mauvaise foi" and is the opposite of the sincerity or 
authent1cityW1ich Sartre proposes as a moral criterion. 
For if men as free beings are the creators of their own 
values they should at least be true to these values 
otherwise such values are meaningless and empty. Roquentin, 
all t,)o conscious of the insincerity of the attitudes Jf 
the Bouvillois, undertakes to purge himself of inauthen-
ticity. In a lucid revolt he refuses their poses, 
illusions, and attitudes. Yet he sees others playing 
their parts so well and so unquestioningly that it 
frightens him .for he al,)ne seems not content to fit into 
a ready-made m:)uld. C::>nsciously desirous of sincerity 
he refuses to conform t) a codified existence and thereby 
compromise his essential freedom which is the power to 
change. 
By rejecting the bad faith of comfortable illusions 
Roquentin bec·::>mes receptive to the revelation of the 
nature 'Jf existence through the experience ::>f nnausea". 
His awareness of the external world is extremely acute 
and he is 'Jbsessed with the horrid disgust which material 
obJects arouse in him. 
His very reason for keeping a diary is in the hope 
':Jf being able t::> analyse and thereby understand the 
strange experiences he has recently enc~untered. 
nQuelque ch·::>ae m 'est arrive... c 'est venu 'a la 
faron d'une malad1e ••• Je crois que c'est mo! 
qul ai chang6" he explains. (N. p.15-16) 
His first inkling of this is apparently a min~r matter but 
a significant one. Alth~ugh by his own admission he takes 
a pleasure in picking up dirty old bits of rag and paper -
"Il m 'est agrJa b le de lea prendre,. de fermer ma 
main sur eux; podr un peu je lea porterais ~ 
ma bouche, c0mme font lee efants." (N. p.22) 
- he suddenly finds himself quite unable to t:)uch a scrap 
')f muddy jl rain-soaked paper. 
"Je n 'ai pas pu ratnasser le papier c 'est tout ••• 
Je ne auis plus libre, je ne peux plus faire ce 
que je veux." (N. p.22-23) 
Objects have assumed a living presence, have become 
"des bates vivantesn, and he realises that he is actually 
afraid to be touched by them. For now tactile sensations 
seem transferred; he does not touch objects, instead he 
feels them touch him. After this realisation has come 
to him he is better able to understand the feeling he had 
when at the seaside he held a pebble in his hand and it 
provoked "une espece d'lc:::eurement douce~tre ••• une s:Jrte de 
nauaE6e dans lea mains." (N. p. 23) 
Similar incidents follow and Roquentin faithfully 
chr~nicles his experience or nauseating disgust when he 
touches a door knob, or looks at a glass of beer, or at 
the braces of the cafe owner. As he shakes the 
Autodidacte's hand it doesn't seem like a human hand at 
all. Even his own body has become an alien thing and 
the reflection of his face in the mirror rouses no real 
recognition; it is eimply "une chose grise". 
Objective reality has ceased t•:> be recognizable. 
Instead it has become an incomprehensible chaos of shaky 
viac::>sity threatening to engulf him. Objects have the 
p::>\r.~er to seem to be totally different to \'1hat they are. 
Their given names are therefore meaningless, as Roquentin 
discovers when, sitting in a tram he realizes the word 
"seat" is ridiculously inapplicable to the :>bject it is 
supposed to name. Words are jut:!t man 'a futile gesture t,::> 
impose a meaning in an incomprehensible world. 
"Je murmure: c'est ure banquette, un peu comme 
un exorcisme. Maia le mot reate sur mea l~vres: 
11 refuse d'aller se poser sur la chose •••• Les 
choses se sont delivrees de leur noms. Elles 
sont la, grotesques, t~tues, g~antes et 9a 
parait imbecile de lee appeler des banquettes 
ou de dire quoi que se soit sur elles: je suis 
au milieu des chases, lea innomables. Seul, 
sans mots, sans defenses, elles m'environment, 
e.ous moi, derr•iere moi, au-dessus de moi." (N. p.159) 
The climax of his metaphysical experience comes as he 
gazes at the root of a chestnut tree in the park. This time 
his nausea is of greater than usual intensity and in a 
blinding flash (an "illumination" he calls it) he 
suddenlY understands what it means ~o exist". 
What first becomes. evident to n1m is that no ')bject 
retains 1 t a own ident1 ty' they are a 11 part of the one 
sticky mess. 
"La d1vet~sit$ des choses, leur individualit6 
n'eta1t qu'une apparence, un vernia. Ce vernia 
avait fondu; 11 restait des masses monstrueuses 
et molles, en desordre- nuea, d'une effr~yante 
et obsc~ne nudit6." (N. p.162) 
The second part of his revelation concerns the 
superfluousness of all existing things. 
"Nous etions un tas d 'e;datanta g~nes, embarrsssefs 
de nous-m~mes. nous n'av1ans pas la m::>lndre 
raison d'@tre la, n1 lea uns ni lea autrea, 
chaque existent, confus, vaguement inquiet, se 
sentait de trop par rapport aux autres. DE TROP: 
c'etait le aeul rapport que je pusae 6tablir entre 
ces arbres, ces grillej, ces cailloux •••••••••••• 
Et MOI ... MOI AUSSI J'ETAIS DE TROP." (N. p.163) 
Having realised that all things are superfluous and 
unnecessary he is raced with the subsequent realisation 
of the absurdity of a universe where nature pr::>vides no 
absolute law. Existence is purely gz•atuitous with a 
total absence of logical necessity. Since there is no 
ultimate reason for existing the world is reduced to 
absurdity. 
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"Le mot d • Absurd! te na!t ~ pr~sent sous ma 
plume; ••• Je comprenais que j'avais trouv6 la 
clABe 1 9Existence, la cl~ de mea Nausees, de 
malpropre vie. De fait, tout ce que J'ai pu 
saisir ensuite se ram)me a cette absurdite' fondamentale." 
(N. p.164) 
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Thus the human consciousness is depicted as trapped in an 
a lien, incomprehensible world. And because it feels 
'de trop• in a superfluity or objects, that consciousness 
is nauseated and "ang:>isa~" at its own absurdity. 
But the anguish of such a tota 1 absence ·<Jf nationality 
and necessity is unbearable and Roquentin seeks I'efuge fr'Jm 
the nightma:r•iah viscosity of existence. During his 
supreme experience of Nausea he has realised that he, like 
everything else, is "de trop". This he understands with 
his mind but as yet does not feel it subjectively. The 
fear that he will drives him t:) consider suicide as a means 
or escape. 
"Je :r:evais vaguement de me supprimer, pour an6ant1r 
au moine une de ces eJfistences superfluea. Mala 
ma m~J:rt m&me eut - ~te de trop." (N. p.16') 
Even his death would be meaningless and so provide no 
escape from absurdity. 
Nor can he ignore his experiences and fall back on 
the illusery values of the "salauds" which he has 
ceteg:;~rically rejected as insincere, for then he too would 
be guilty of "bad faith". 
Unlike the Autodidacte - that cruelly comic caricature 
or a "culture vulture" avidly devouring every book: in the 
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library in alphabetical ·:>rder - RDquentin cannot accept 
traditional humanist co::mcepts ?f the n:>bility :)f man and 
the benevolence ')f Nature. Such lofty ideals are 
f'iguratively demolished when the Aut'Jdidacte is humiliated 
by being caught in the act of performing a minor indecency: 
"Tout s 'est ecroule d 'un coup, ses reves de 
culture, see reves d'entente q.lltec les hommes." 
(N. p.201) 
I Whereas the characters Jf Malraux or Saint-Exupery 
may find their raiscm d '~tre in living f'or the present 
moment of excitement, Roquentin cannot return to his f-::>rmer 
active life of travel and adventure for he has discovered 
that "adventure" is a fictitious concept, something which 
may be anticipated or seen in retrospect but which at 
the time is not in itself significant. His f'Jrmer 
mistress, Anny, is guilty of a similar deception in her 
longing for "perfect momentsn. But when he meets her 
aR:ain she too has become disillusloned with this ideal of 
"perfect m0ments 11 which corresponded to his desire for 
"adventures". 
"Il n'~ a pas d'aventures- il n'y ~pas de moments 
parfatts •••• nous avons perdu les memes illusions, 
n•;)US avons suivi les mgmes chemins." (N. p.188) 
Anny's unexpected letter asking him to see her in 
Paris has given him a sort of hope of re-establishing a 
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communion with another human beinr~ and theref·ore of 
escaping his alienation and nausea but in this respect 
their reunion is a complete failure. She has changed 
and with disillusionment her life is now as aimless as 
hie. They cannot communicate or understand each other. 
As he is on the point of leaving he says: 
'u'Alors il faut que Je te quitte spree t •avoir retrou~ee." 
"Non 6 dit-elle lentement. non. Tu ne m'as 
pas retrouv6e."" (N. p.193) 
Back in Bouville Roqueotin realises: 
"J 'avais compte sur Anny p:>ur me sauver ••• 
Anny n'est revenue que pour m'oter tout 
e s poi r • " ( N. p. 1 96 ) 
Resigning himself to the fact that there can be no 
escape from his anguish, Roquentin decides to leave Bouville 
and live instead in Paris. Not that he expects to be free 
from his nausea in Paris, for one city is very much like 
another and all a;re threatened by the slimy "Vegetation" 
which he imagines lurking f:->r the opportunity to engulf them. 
But, surprisingly, as he is waiting for• his train, 
passing the time drinking in the cafe, Roquentin experiences 
an:>ther illumination - this time not of nausea and anguish 
but the means of salvation for them. The waitress 
plays for him f:>r the last time a record which he has heard 
on several previous occasions. As he listens t:> the song 
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- an American jazz number tts~me of these Days" sung by a 
Negress, it seems to him that the melody is s~mething pure 
and necessary. It is "unisoilffrance ... mod~ le" which does 
not "exist", it simply ll• "c'est comme m0i qu'il faut 
'&tre; il faut souf'frir en mesure" the melody tells him, 
for the melody bel~ngs to a realm beyond existence. 
He thinks of the composer and the singer wh·o, by the 
rhythmic purity .of this melody, have been able to transcend 
the plane of existence. 
"En vo11~ deux qui sor'1t sauv~: le Juif et la 
Negresse. Sauv~s. Ils se 1sont peut-~tre cru perdue Jusqu 1au bout, noyes dans l'existence. 
Et pourtant, personne ne pourrait penser a moi 
comme je pense a eux, avec cette douceur. 
Personne, pas ~me Anny. · Ils sont un peu pour 
moi comme des morts, un P,eu comme des heros de 
roman; ils se sont• lav~s du pec~e d'exister. 
Pas compl~tement, bien sGr - maie tout autant 
qu'un homme ~eut faire. Cette id~e me boule-
verse tout d un c;.)Up, parae que je n 'esperais meme 
plus !a· Je sene ~uelque chose qui me f'role 
timidement et je n ose pas b:>uger parce que J 'ai 
peur que 9a ne e'en aille. Quelque chose que 
Je ne conbsissais plus: una espece de Joie." 
(N.p.221) 
Thus Roquentin discovers the intimati·::m of his own 
redemption. By substituting the harmoni::>us world of 
artistic creation for the viscosity of the objective world 
he can perhaps escape human an~uish. A creative act will 
give some meaning to his life. He will write a book$ 
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but not like his abondonned w~rk on M. de Rollebon for 
that was merely an attempt to rec :mstruct the past. 
Actually writing the book, he knows., will be a dreary day 
t~:> day chore but: 
"Mala 11 v1endra1t bien un moment ou le 
livre serait. ecrit, serait derrt'ere moi et je pense qu'un peu de sa clart~ tomberait sur 
mon passe. Alors peut-~tre que je pourrais, 
a travers lui, me rappeler ma Vie sans re'pugnance." 
(N. p.222) 
His book will have tha same sort of necessity as the melody 
and he will then be able to accept his own existence, at 
least in the past. 
Critical opinion is sharply divided about Roquentin's 
problem of tne nausea of existence being overcome by this 
"aesthetic solution 11 •. Some have interpreted the ending as · 
purely ironical, with Antoine Roquentin falling into the 
trap Jf self ... deception by accepting-, as an escape, an 
illusion which is just as false and invalid as the other 
illusions he so caustically rejects. Certainly it is 
quite unexpected that he should discover any solution at 
all considering his previ~us anguish and despair. As 
Claude-Edmonde Magny (5) points out, one may wonder if 
this iB n-ot a last minute "c·~nversi,:m in extremis" to 
h'Jpe, the weakness of the flesh being ultimately unable to 
accept what the mind in its moments of lucidity has 
c 'Jn firmed. 
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The fact that Roquentin should have perceived the 
intimations of his salvation through a piece of music. 
however unprepossessing, is the more surprising since Just 
pri)r to this he has 1 in typically venamous vein, dismissed 
the notion of finding consolation in music. 
rec Jrd begins playing he thirlks: 
When the 
nDi re qu 'il y a des imbe:c i les pour puiser des 
consolations dans lea Beaux-arts. Comma ma 
tante Bigeois: 'Lea Preludes de Chopin m 'ont 
ete un tel sec-:>ura a la mort de ton pauvre 
cmcle '." (N. p.217) 
It is indeed ironical that immediately following thi.s 
outburst he should find himself succumbing to the appeal 
of melody. But could not thi.s abrupt volta face be 
indicative of the genuineness of his revelation? For 
surely he knows himself t:::>o well by now to be duped into 
voicing a solution which he does not believe in and it 
would be totally out of character if, after his tireless 
search for sincerity, he were to embrace an unauthentic 
attitude at this advanced stage. 
I believe that Roquentin happens upon this means of 
salvation in all good faith. After a 11 the impact of 
the novel would b~ seriously impaired if the conclusion 
was a rejection of all that had preceded it 1 and the whole 
point or La Naue'e is that one should discover the real 
nature of existence, accept its absurdity, and. strive for 
a sincere modus vivendi in spite of this. If Roquentin 
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sincerely accepts this means of giving his life a purpose, 
justification through art is valid for him. I do not 
think that this is merely a convenient device inserted 
by the author to solve his hero's predicament. 
One must take into account that this is Sartre's 
first novel and written rea:::nnably early in his writing 
career. As such we must accept it at its race value and 
not be tempted t~ impose on it an interpretation perhaps 
more in keeping with his way of thinking as it is revealed 
in later W'Jrks. 
In Lea Mota, rtre, referring to his flrst n·ovel, 
tells us: ":} 'e'tais Roquentin, je montrais en lui, sans 
C()mplaisance, la trame de ma Vie;" (M. p.210) There 
are obvious biographic.al parallels of people and places -
Bouvllle, for instance, is known to represent Le Havre 
where Sartre was "exiled" to teach for a time. More than 
this Roquentin's thoughts and feelings, his discovery of 
the nature of existence and his obsessive hallucinations 9 
are drawn directly from Sartre 's otvn experience 'Jf such. 
But the simple equation, Roquentln equals Sartre, wlll 
not suffice and Sartre immediately emphasises: " ••• en nieme 
temps J'etaisJlli21, 1'6'lu, annaliete des enfers •••••• " (M. p.210) 
He was himself 1Q the character of Roquentin as well as 
being the creator of that character. His reader is, 
therefore, surely entitled to expect sincerity, not irony, 
in his conclusion. 
Sartre has spoken of his youthful belief in the 
mystique of literature as a means of salvation and his 
attitude towards literature remained fundamentally 
unchanged in the early part of his writing career. Just 
when this attitude did change is difficult to determine but 
it is possible that at the time of writing La Naua~e he was 
still thinking in terms of the possibility of salvation 
through art, (although Francis Jeans::m (6 ) assures us 
that at this stage Sartre had already rejected the aesthetic 
B'.)lution ). This is a matter which Sartre proposes 
answering in a further autobiographical volume. Until 
then one can only speculate. We do know that at some 
stage he is disillusioned with the powers of literature but 
he continues to write nevertheless: 
" ••• n'importe; je fais, je ferais des livres,. 
il en faut; ••• La Culture ne sauve rien ni 
personne,. elle ne justifie pas. Mais c'est 
un produit de l'homme; 11 s'y projette, s'y 
reconna1t; seula ce miroir critique lui offre 
son image." (M. p. 211 ) 
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So despite his disillusionment Sartre is even now bound 
to recognise the humanistic value of art and letters. 
A little further on in Lea Mots, speaking of his 
dedication to a writing career, he notes the protective 
role of this »rolie": 
" ••• rna seule affaire 4tait de me sauver ... rien dans 
lea mains, rien dans lea poches - par le travail 
et la foi •••• sans equipement, sans outillage je 
me suis mis tout en tier a 1 'oeuvre pour me aauver 
tout entier." (M. p.212) 
Writing therefore has an intensely personal importance for 
him 41 and note his repeated reference to his "salvation". 
In retrospect he can see his creative activity of the 
La Nause'e period as his chosen pr:1ject, as a "n~\frose" 
(M. p.13) preserving him from reality. In terms of his 
:>wn work then, it was the very aesthetic, or literary, 
solution which allowed him to escape the anguish :>f 
Roquentin. 
Yet, as Miss Murd::>ch (7) notes, the conclusion of 
La Naus~e is merely sketched in and not sufficiently 
developed to pose as a real solution to Roquentin's problem. 
The novel really has no conclusion in the true sense of the 
word, it just happens to stop at the point in Roquentin 's 
existence when, beset by anguish, he perceives a possible 
salvation. Whether or not it ~Mould become his ac tua 1 
salvation we are not in a position to know, although by 
not elaborating the suggestion, Sartre is perhaps implying 
- . 
that this is in fact no remedy. Roquentin is "sans 
importance collective •••• tout juste un individu", who can 
see no salvation in personal relationships, in political 
action, or social function, and who has rejected the 
noti01fof "adventure 11 as giving a meaning to life. He may 
well find artistic endeavour equally unsatisfying. I think 
that the way of aesthetic redemption offered at the end 
of La NausJe is a belief which he sincerely held at the time 
but which would later be rejected as only a temporary 
refuge, if any, from metaphysical "angoisse". 
At the time of writing the novel, Sartre was no doubt 
fully aware that a solution could be found only by facing 
the problem and not by escaping from it by art or by any 
other external means. La Naus~e has served to illustrate 
the more negative side of his philosophy. The attempt to 
be positive will follow later. As a cure for the anguish 
of a consciousness forced to recognise absurdity, Sartre is 
to propose a more rigorous solution whereby man is to be 
called upon to seek his freedom and affirm his responsibility 
for his destiny even in the face of Nothingness and Absurditw. 
This theme is to form a basis for the novel sequence 
Les Chemins de la Libert,J to which we now turn our attention. 
CHAPTER III 
L' AGE DE RAISON 
~'Age de Raison was published in 1945 as the first 
volume of Sartre's intended tetralogy entitled Lea Chemins 
de la Libert,. Of the three volumes which have been 
c·,mpleted, this first is the ·:me which C')Uld most easily 
stand alone as a single nc>vel. The events in the lives 
of the characters with which the book deals take place in 
1938 and, although one senses that the characters are 
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caught up in the rising tension of the pre-war e:ra, the 
atm::>sphe::re :>f this novel is less situated in the hist::>rical 
context than is the case with the subsequent v:>lumes. The 
problems which confront the characters a:re of a specifically 
personal nature and require an individual solution. 
For Sartre man's ability to desire and assert his 
freedom is his distinctive characteristic and Sa:rtre 'a 
intention in Lee Chemins de la Liberte, as the title itself 
indicates, is to study the various ways in which his 
characters seek their freedom. Mathieu Dela:rue, thirty-
four year old philosophy teacher at a Paris lycee, is the 
ch()aen subject for detailed study in L'Age de Raia·:m. 
The consciousneases of other characters, particularly 
Daniel and Brunet, in their pursuit of freedom are ale:> 
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examined in the course of the book but in less depth 
and as a contrast to the main character. Mathieu Delarue, 
as the principal protagonist of the novel, provides the 
unity for the work since he is directly involved with the 
main features of the plot and he is also the focus from 
which radiate the secondary characters and the sub-themes 
concerning .them. I should like first to examine the 
details of the actual plot of L'Age de Raison in order to 
establish the relationships between characters and events 
and their relationships with each other. Then I wish to 
look more closely at the character of Mathieu as it 
emerges in the course of the novel, and to trace the 
development of his consciousness in attaining the "age of 
reason." 
The physical action of this novel is concerned mainly 
with Mathieu's efforts to obtain the necessary money to 
enable his pregnant mistress, Marcelle, to have an 
abortion. Although she has been his mistress for seven 
years, when she informs him of her pregnancy it does not 
occur to Mathieu to marry her and let her keep the baby. 
He dismisses this possibility outright for two reasons -
firstly because he has grown tired of her and no longer 
loves her; secondly, a reason which is of more importance 
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to Mathieu. he prides himself on his independence and to 
allow himself to slip easily into the ready-made roles of 
husband and father would be to compromise·his precious 
11 freed om". H::~wever. his request for a loan is refused by 
Daniel. his friend, out of malice, and by his bourgeois 
brother Jaques out of a misguided notion that it is for 
Mathieu's own good. It is only when he finds such 
difficulty in obtaining the 4,000 francs needed that 
Mathieu begins to consider marrying Marcelle. 
At the same time as Mathieu is engaged upon his 
humiliating and futile search for money he is wrestling 
with the emotional problems caused by his obsession with a 
young Russian girl, Ivich. She is a curious character, 
bearing a striking resemblance to the petulant Xavi~re of 
Simone de Beauvoir's novel L'Invit{e. {1 ). Ivich's 
perverse unpredictability, her ambivalent sexual tendencies, 
and her almost mystical communication with her brother 
Boris, make.her something of an enigma, not fully 
elucidated by the author and apparently as unfathomable to 
Sartre as to his reader and to Mathieu. The image of 
y::>uthfulness which both she and Boris present to him 
fascinates Mathieu who has a need for the company of young 
people for at thirty-four he already feels old. 
Obsessed by his desire for freedom Mathieu has 
scorned family ties, avoided the social institution of 
marriage_. and refused political or ideological affiliations. 
Nevertheless he knows that his life is empty and dessicated. 
He has no sense of purpose and is aware that for years he 
has deceived himself into believing that a sort of 
"availability" to whatever the future might bring is 
indeed freedom. He longs for some free act which will 
give meaning to his dreary existence but being a man 
incapable of decisive action he expects freedom to descend 
upon him like a sort of Grace. 
This inability to act is characterized by the motif 
running thr::»ugh the book of Mathieu's nagging feelings of 
guilt about remaining uninvolved in the Spanish Civil War. 
In fact the novel opens with this motif. Mathieu encounters 
a drunken beggar who, in return for charity, gives him a 
Spanish postage stamp saying that he had wanted to go and 
fight in Spain only "9a ne s'est pas arrange. 11 (AR. p.1 0) 
Refusing his offer of a drink, a thing he would not have 
done once upon a time, Mathieu puts the stamp in his 
pocket and later shows it to Marcelle when he visits her. 
As he enters her room he feels that he is entering a 
shell. Wallace Fowlie (2 ) has pointed out the symbolism 
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or this room with its flesh pink walls seeming to close 
in on him just as Marcelle's pregnancy offers a trap to 
Mathieu's freedom. Marcelle is treated somewhat 
unsympathetically by her author. She is shown as a 
passive and weak character who, knowing Mathieu's views 
on his independence, does not expect marriage but is 
quite resigned to having an abortion. But Daniel, her 
"archangel", is to put the idea into her mind that she 
really wants to keep the baby. Sartre uses Marcelle to 
give vent to his horror of the flesh. Mathieu is appalled 
at the thought of his child growing in her womb and he 
cannot prevent a feeling or loathing and disgust as he 
looks at Marcelle's body. Like Roquentin in his moments 
or nausea, he experiences the disturbing sensation of the 
room and its objects seeming to assume an altered appear-
ance as he realizes the situation to the full. 
When Mathieu leaves we are shown an instance of 
Sartre's theory of "le regard" acting as a fixitive on 
the consciousness. Hoping to hide his guilt in the dark-
ness or the night, Mathieu suddently senses the weight or 
Marcelle's thoughts of him even though she can no longer 
see him. At once he feels that he is being judged and to 
escape the presence or her consciousness he enters a bar 
where he will be physically seen by consciousnesses other 
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than here who see him differently. 
Leaving the bar he goes to see the abor•tionlsv 
Marcelle has in mind but seeing the squalid filth of her 
rooms he is beset by his scruples and cannot allow 
Marcelle to go there. He goes to Sarah for advice. 
U.,oking at her child,. Pablo,. he realizes that his own 
child is already an incipient consciousness and is.uneasy 
that he should be about to prevent its existence. Sarah 
tells him of a "reputable" doctor,. a Jewish refuge'e whose 
fee is ll,OOO francs. 
Again Mathieu is reminded or the Spanish War and his 
own inertia for Sarah's husband,. Gomez,. is fighting in 
Barcelona and when Mathieu arrives his one-time friend 
Brunet is there. Brunet is a thorn in Mathieu's conscience 
for whereas Mathieu reflects, Brunet acts. Mathieu 
envies him since as an active member or the Communist 
Party he has found a couse with which to identify himself. 
"Il est plus libre que moi: ,'\ il est d'accord avec lui-meme 
et d'accord avec le Part!," (AR. P•129) thinks Mathieu. 
In this later scene at Mathieu's appartment Brunet tries 
to persuade him too to opt for active commitment to the 
Party. He tells Mathieu: "Tu as renonc~ a tout pour 
~tre libre. ' ) Fais un pas de plus, renonce a la liberte 
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elle-m~tne: et tout sera rendu." {AR. p.127) 
Realizing that it has now become impossible for him to 
communicate with Brunet on a purely personal level, 
Mathieu knows that by joining the Communist Party he could 
re-establish their former friendship, which has.evidently 
meant a great deal to him. His political sympathies, 
although unstated, naturally lie with the Left and he would 
like to acknowledge them. "Entrer au Part!, donner un 
sensa sa vie, choisir d'etre un homme, agir, croire. 
Ce serait le salut," (AR. p.129) are the thoughts which 
tempt him. But lacking Brunet's decisiveness he refuses 
to commit himself because he does not consider that he 
has reason enough to do so, and for the reflective Mathieu 
with his analytical lucidity reasons are all important. 
In the meantime, however, Mathieu has still been 
trying to solve his immediate problem. Daniel has 
refused to lend him the money, although in a position to 
do so, and Mathieu is forced to humiliate himself by 
applying to his brother Jaques. Jaques is quick to 
point out that he is compromising his "principles" in 
resorting to family ties when he needs a loan although 
otherwise he rejects them completely. Principles are all 
very well in theory, he tells Mathieu " ••• mais 11 me 
semble qu'avec tea idees, j 1aurais a coeur de ne rien 
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demander ~ un aftreux bourgeois. oar je suis un affreux 
bourgeois, ajouta·t-11 en l"iant de bon o oeur." (AR. p.11 0) 
Clearly Sartre does not intend that we should prefer 
Jaques to Mathieu • he is pompous, self-satisfied, and of 
course a typical bourgeois "salaud" 1n Sartre's eyes .,. but 
ironically enough,it is Jaques who enlightens Mathieu as 
to a few home-truths about his so-called "freedom" and his 
bad-faith and self-deception. "c'est ta vie tout enti'ere 
qui est b&tie sur un menson@e," {AR. p.114) he tells 
Mathieu .. In fact Mathieu is as much a bourgeois as he is 
but will not admit it. 
" .... Ecoute, dit Mathieu, il y a un malentendu 
entre nous: je me souc1e fort peu d'etre ou 
de n'Stre pas un bourgeois. Ce que je veux 
simplement c'est ••• • 11 aoheva entre sea dents 
1 
serrees avec une sorte de honte-garder ma 11berte • 
•••• J'aura1s cru, mol, dit Jaques, que la 11bert~ 
cons1sta1t a regarder en face lea situations ou 
l'on s'est mis de son plein gr' eta accepter 
toutes ses respons1b1lites, Mais 9a n'est sans 
doute pas ton avis: tu oondamnes la societe 
capitaliste, et pourtant tu ea fonctionnaire dans 
oette societe, tu affiohes une sympathie de 
principe pour les communistes: ma1s tu te,gardes 
bien de t'engager, tu n'as Jamais vote. Tu 
meprises la claase bourgeoise et pourtant tu es 
bourgeois, fils et rrere de bourgeois et tu vis 
comme un bourgeois." (AR. p.115) 
In spite or a lingering sense or guilt, ~pame, and 
inferiority, Mathieu does not concede that Jaques may be 
right. 
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Mathieu's next opportunity is provided by Boris who 
tells him that Lola keeps a large sum of money in her 
room. Knowing that she dislikes him Mathieu will not ask 
her and she refuses Boris's request for money on a 
friend's behalf. In the previous pages of the novel we 
have seen quite a lot of Boris, mainly in his association 
with Lola, a night-club singer considerably older than 
himself, who clings to her youthful lover in a desperate 
attempt to preserve her own youth. This relationship 
provides a parallel to Mathieu's obsession with Ivich. 
Borisl, Ivich's brother, is a self-consciously young 
nineteen-year-old whose wish is to die at twenty-five so 
as not to grow old. He does not love Lola and their 
physical relationship is repugnant to him but her maturity 
gives him the security he lacks. A peculiar quirk in his 
character is his passion for stealing - simply because he 
is fascinated by the psychology and technique of theft. 
What he steals is not important; as long as the theft is 
well executed, as blatantly as possible, Boris feels a 
triumphant satisfaction. 
His affection and admiration for Mathieu, his former 
mentor, amounts to an almost idolatrous veneration and he 
is a fervent disciple of Mathieu's teaching regarding 
freedom which he accepts unquestioningly. 
"on a le devoir de raire tout ce qu 'on veut, 
de penser tout ce qui vous semble bon, de 
n'etre responsable que davant soi-meme et de 
remettre en question, constamment, tout ce 
qu on pense et tout le monde. Boris avait 
bat! sa vie la-dessus et il etait 
scrupuleusement libra: en particulier, 11 
remettait toujours le monde en que~tion, sau~ 
Mathieu et Ivich; ces deux-la, c'etait tout a 
fait inutile, attendu qu'ils ltaient parfaits. 
Quant a la liberte, il n 'etait pas bon non 
plus de s'interroger sur ella, parce qu'alors 
on cessait d'etre libra." (AR. -.147) 
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~lhEm Boris, believing Lola is dead, appeals to Mathieu 
to help him recover some letters he had written to her, 
Mathieu goes to her room and gets them from the locked 
case where she also keeps her banknotes. Here is the 
money he needs but his bourgeois sen$e of morality will 
n~t permit him to steal them. He leaves but changes his 
mind and goes back when he considers it is his duty to 
Marcelle to get the money one way or another, however, by 
this time Lola has roused from her drugged coma and the 
opportunity is gone. Bitterly Mathieu reproaches 
himself: 
"Je n 'ai pas pu prendre 1 'argent; ma liberte' 
c'est un mythe •••• Vouloir ce que je suis, c'est 1 la seule libert~ qui me reate. Ma seule liberte: 
voule¢.t 6pouser Marcelle." (AR. p.229) 
But he knows that in this too he is only trying to 
deceive himself. To abandon Marcelle, that would be an 
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act of real freedom, but he cannot bring himself to do 
it. As a last resort he .tries to raise fincence through 
a ml)ney-lender but since formalities w::>uld take t::>o long 
he resigns himself to marrying Marcelle. Almost immediately 
he rebels ageinst.his indifference. realizing that.whetever 
happens it will be of his choosing~ As a hypochondriac 
enjoys illness. Mathieu's seif-pity relishes this 
"condemnatLm" to liberty. 
"Il etait seul, au milieu d 'un mJnstrueux silence, 
libr~ et seul. sans niche et sans excuse, 
condemn~ a dicider sans recours p:.>ssible, condemn~ 
pour toujours~~tre libre." (AR. p.258) 
But actually he does not have t·) "decidett anything. 
The matter is taken quite out :>f his hands by, of all 
persons, Daniel. This same Daniel who earlier refused to 
lend him the money t'=> get him '::>Ut ::>f his predicament now. 
surprisingly, informs him that he is t'=> marry Marcelle, 
ostensibly so that she may keep the baby. But his price 
for thus safeguarding Mathieu's independence is to '::>blige 
him to hear his confession ::>f homosexuality. Daniel's 
motive is partly to rid himself of some of his guilt since 
there will be "quelqu'un qui salt" (AR. p.31f) but 
Mathieu is hardly the type to be shocked by such an 
admission. 
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John Weightman (3) suggests that: "it never seems 
to occur to him (Mathieu) that. there is a moral problem in 
allowing the child to be born into the rather wierd 
menage that Daniel and Marcelle will form." This is 
not so. Without consciously kn~wing why, Mathieu is 
uneasy about the idea of their marriage even though it 
will provide a way out for him, and this is before Daniel's 
confession. Following this Mathieu has sufficient moral 
conscience to realize that he cannot allow Marcelle to marry 
Daniel and he immediately telephones her to say he wants to 
marry her after all. But by now it is too late to repair 
the damage of their earlier quarrel and she hangs up on 
him. The outcome becomes irrevocable - Marcelle will 
marry Daniel. 
Daniel is an altogether strange, somewhat menacing 
character. Like Roquentin in La Naus6e he is obsessed 
by the elusiveness of his own existence. The problem of 
achieving self-coincidence, of changing the non-being of 
his consciousness into a stable being, bas become a 
constant obsession with him, no doubt because of the 
particular nature of his case. Daniel is a homosexual 
who is unable to accept himself for what he is and therefore 
lives a life of complicated deception, even lying to 
himself. He cannot experience the coincidence of his 
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being with his vice. Rather he is at the one time 
himself and a detached ob~erver of himself,· as if he 
were two different people. This almost schizophrenic 
incapacity to realize he is what he is, is perhaps most 
clearly illustrated in the scene at the Kermesse where he 
knowingly watches an older man strike up an acquaintance 
with a younger man. Daniel is maliciously enjoying 
humiliating them by his observation when he is greeted 
by one of his own former lovers, Bobby. Immediately he 
is reduced to humiliated shame and disgust at being 
recognized as the same as those he had been observing with 
such callous detachment. 
Deeply conscious of his sexual abnormality, although 
it seems quite unreal to him, Daniel resorts to self-
torment in one form or another as a punishment or expiation 
for his guilt. He is the would-be sado-masochist who, 
by assuming the dual role of tormentor and tormented, 
hopes to achieve some measure of self-identification 
which he can not otherwise experience. 
It is surely this masochistic tendency which causes 
him to define "freedom" as "to do the opposite to what 
one wishes." This is not real freedom, as Mathieu is 
quick to realize, but it is the only sort of freedom 
Daniel knows since it fulfils his need for self-punishment 
and perhaps therefore grants him a little temp::>rary peace 
of mind. For Daniel is very much aware of his separation 
from those other "normal" people who are at peace with 
themselves, that is, who have learned to accept their own 
nature. 
In contrast to those norma 1 "hommes de bonne volontlf": 
"Daniel e'tait un homme de mauvaise volonte," (.AR. p.145) 
hating himself and others. He has already manifested the 
malicious side of his nature in his contrariness in not 
lending Mathieu money when in a position to do so, for 
no other reason than pure spite. For Daniel, returning 
from his futile attempt to drown his beloved cats as a 
gesture of self-punishment, finds Mathieu's air of super-
iority and unormalite" unbearable .. When he learns the 
reason fJr Mathieu's request Daniel relishes the 
a'f..'>~kvvardness of his friend's situation and almoet against 
his wilr; he refuses to reach for the money in his wallet 
which w0uld solve Mathieu's p:r•oblem. He has a gener:>us 
side to his nature and his first impulse is to help r~thieu 
but instead finds himself withh~lding his assidtance. 
For thi~3 life of deception has become so habitual that 
Daniel is constantly finding himself doing the opposite 
to what he would really want. 
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He knows quite well that Mathieu knows he has the 
money. for his excuses were hardly meant to be convincin~, 
and he is disappointed that Mathieu bears him no i11-will 
in spite of this. "Il sait que J'ai l'argent et il ne 
me bait pas: qu 'est-ce qu 111 taut done leur faire?" 
(AR. p .. 1 05) His last phrase betrays his reason for 
acting so contrarily - his need to feel hated which is 
an extension of his obsession for punishment. 
Also, not being at peace with himself, he envies 
Mathieu's apparent calm detachment: 
"Pas un instant .... il n'a cea::H:f d'~tre 
pondere, dispos, en parfait accord lltOt'ec 
lui-m~me. Il est emmerde, mais pa lui 
reate extEf'rieur. An dedans 11 est chez soi." 
( AR. p.1 05) 
This appears to Daniel as precisely the sort ·'Jf peaceful 
self-coincidence which he himself cannot attain and his 
jealousy arouses a desire for revenge. He cannot bear 
Mathieu's apparent "freedom" so to be instrumental in 
limiting this freedom would perhaps satisfy him and his 
final thought in the chapter is: "Taitt de meme, ga 
vaudrait mille s 9il etait obliged 'epouser Marcelle." 
(AR. p .. 105) 
He has already t:r•ied unsuccessfully to promote thie 
end by telling Mathieu that here is a perfect opportunity 
for 11un acte de li bert', n explaining that by liberty he 
understanas ''de faire expres le contraire de ce qu 'on 
veut. On se .rent devenir un autre." (AR. p.104) 
This type of 11 free act" is the sort of thing which Daniel 
consciously tries to perform all the time but it has no 
appeal for Mathieu. That is not the sort of freedom with 
which he is concerned. 
By refusing to lend money for an abortion·, ana later 
by persuading Marcelle that she really wants to have her 
baby, Daniel is trying to force Mathieu into an unwanted 
marriage which will curb his inaependence, Daniel's motive 
being vengeance prompted by envy. Why, at the end of the 
book, he shoula suadenly take it upon himself to marry 
Marcelle is a matter for Cliscussion. 
Some critics, Wallace Fowlie for instance, (4) 
interprets this action as a final desperate bid for 
redemption on Daniel's part. It is clear that Henri 
Peyre, a very able Sartrian critic, also subscribes in 
passing to this motive of redemption. (5) Having failed 
t::;J ;;:_p through with the act of self-mutilation and suicide 
w~icb w~ll deliver him from his perversion, shortly 
afterwards, while regaining his composure in a bar, Daniel 
hits upon marrying Marcelle as the only possible means of 
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"deliverance" from his predicament. Since he cannot 
either come to terms with the role his nature imposes 
upon him, nor destroy his nature in the manner of the 
Old Testament recommendation: "If thine eye offend thee, 
pluck it out," by deliberately assuming a different role, 
that of Marcelle's "archangel", he can at least hope to 
achieve a measure of the stability of being, of self-
coincidence, for which he longs and perhaps also find 
relative peace of mind. 
I do think, however, that Fowlie is in error when 
he states that "The obstacle to his suicide is the new 
role he has to play for Marcelle, the new chance offered 
him to realize his perogatives of archangel." {6 ) There 
is no "obstacle" to his committing the act and at the time 
Daniel himself is very much aware that there is nothing 
whatever to prevent it. 
rienne l'en emp~che." 
"Rien ne le pousse ~ d~cider, 
{AR. p. 284) Even when he drops 
the razor he asks himself almost despairingly: 11 Rien ne 
m'empechera done de le prendre? Rien. Tout est inerte 
et tranquille." (AR. p.285) It is not his role of 
archangel which prevents him for he does not realize the 
i 
possibility of this role until afterwards. When it comes 
to the point he is simply too afraid and quite incapable 
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or this final act of self-torture in exactly the same way 
as he was unable to drown his cats. Now, as then, he 
hesitates and is lost and in his heart he has to admit 
that all along he knew he would not be able to carry out 
his intention. 
No doubt the hope -::>f finding his salvation in the 
role of archangel is a part of Daniel's motive for his 
decision to marry Marcelle but I believe that an equally 
strong, if not str•onger., motive is, once again, his 
obsessive need to punish himself. For the idea of 
marrying Marcelle occurs to him as the ~me action he can 
possibly take to replace the action of the self-mutilating 
suicide he is incapable of committing. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the same motivation applies -
his unbearable guilty conscience at not being able to 
accept himself and the need to expiate this guilt by a 
self-inflicted punishment. Mathieu, not without a sense 
of horror and shock, recognizes Daniel's motive as just 
this. "Tu 1 'epouses pour te martyriser," he says, and 
Daniel cannot deny it. (AR. p.316) 
Similarly the confess! ::m of his sexual abn0rmality 
is prompted by the same double motive. It is, as Fowlie 
puts it, " ••• a kind 'Jf capitulat!?n to the world, a 
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worldly suicide. It is the demolishing of his social 
mask." (7) And if one accepts that by marrying Marcelle 
Daniel is indeed seeking redemption then one could inter-
pret his confession almost as a preliminary "purification." 
However, in confession his guilty secret Daniel 'is 
also once more trying to satisfy his craving for self 
torment. Mathieu, who knows Daniel's peculiarity in 
this respect, wonders, somewhat t11earily: "Qu'est-ce 
qu'il lui a pris de venir se torturer chez moi?" (AR. p.313) 
Daniel cannot hate and despise himself enough to overcome 
his guilt and although to make his confession to Mathieu 
is not easy for him he forces himself to do it so that 
there will then be someone other than himself tJ judge 
him. Indeed the idea of CJnfession his abnormality 
occurs to him in exactly those terms of judgement: 
"Ah! n'importe qui, n 91mporte quel juge, 11 
eut accept~ n'importe quel juge mais pas 
lui-m~me, pas cet atroce mepris de soi qui 
n'avait jamais assez de force, ce faible, 
faible m~pris moribond, qui semblait a chaque 
instant sur le point de s'aneantir et qui ne 
passait pas. Si quelqu'un aavait, s'il 
pouvait sentir peser sur lui le l::;urd mepris 
d 'un autre .... " (AR. p.287) 
But C:)nfess!on brings Jlan1el no relief, partly because he 
has no real sense of contr•it!on .. and partly because his 
chosen confessor, Mathieu, is too broadminded to be the 
schocked, harsh judge Daniel needs. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the book Daniel appears 
to have accepted himself. Or at least he understands 
more about his abnormality and the guilt it has br')ught 
him, and, realizing that: "tout lea invertis aont 
h:mteux, c 'eat dans leur nature," ( AR. p. 316) he can at 
least learn to live with his guilt and shame. 
It is with amazement, and envy, that Mathieu realizes 
that this time Daniel has really asserted his will and 
carried out his inten~ed action thereby finding, so it 
seems to Mathieu, the "freedom" which has for so long 
eluded him despite hi~ conscious efforts to attain it. 
Ironically Daniel points out that Mathieu is now free -
that is, he can avoid restricting his independence by 
marriage with Marcelle, but sadly Mathieu sees that this 
is not freedom as he wants it. He is obliged to realize 
that whereas Daniel has chosen to act and that act which 
will change the course of his life is now irrevocable, 
everything he, Mathieu, has ever done or thought Jf doing 
has been for nothing. 
"Mol, tout ce que je fa is, je le fa is pour 
rien: on dirait qu'on me vole les suites de mes 
actes; tout se passe comme si je pouvais-
t)Ujoira reprendre mea coups. Je ne sais pas 
ce que je donnerais pour faire un acte 
irrlmt:fdiable." (AR. p.318) 
The pers?nal difficulty which c mfronts Mathieu in 
his desire to be "free" is that he is too indecisive to 
take positive action. Unlike Bx~net who has made his 
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choice and committed himself Mathieu always hesitates and 
intellectually considers various possibilities. But 
one can spend t)o much time theorizing and the result 
may be complete inaction, f'ot• by the time he has analysed 
the situatiJn it is too late to decide on a course of 
action since circumstances may have changed in the meantime 
and the particular situation no longer exists. As 
Marchelle tells him8 hie life is full of "occasions 
manque'es." (AR. p.16) 
Mathieu is, as Iris Murdoch phrases it, 11 paralysed by 
(8) his excessive lucidity." As a teacher of philosophy 
he is too inclined to rationalize even about his own life. 
Everything he considers doing must have its reason. He 
would perhaps have gone to Spain, joined the Communist 
Party, married Marcelle, except that to the too rational 
Mathieu there simply did not seem sufficient reason to do 
so. (The only sort of unreasoned act which he can 
perform is typified by his stabbing a knife through his 
hand one evening at the Sumatra, partly in emulation of 
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Ivich, partly in defiance of her, But he is Jnly too 
well aware of the folly of believing that this sort of 
meaningless acti·::m is an exercise of one's freedom. ) 
Lola complains to Boris of Mathieu that: "Il faut 
qu '11 refle'chisse sur tout." But for Boris. 
it ie exactly this extreme lucidity in Mathieu's search 
for persona 1 freed a~~ whi~h <t ttracts awe and re::spect: 
"Toi, tu es libre sans le vouloir,." he explains to Lola, 
TancUs que Mathieu, 
c'est raisonne." (AR. p.,6) His y·)ung friends share 
this admiration for the man t~h0 so conscientiou~ly seeks 
his freedom but Marcelle, with her insight, maintains 
that his desire for total freedom by means of lucid 
analysis is his "vice", and indeed this has been his 
obsession as well he knows. 
"C'est comme ca qu'ils me volent, eux, :Caniel, 
Ma:r•ce lle, Brofiet, Jaques~ 1 'n:>mme qui veut etre 
libre ••• il veut @tre libre comme d'autres veulent 
une collection de timbres. La 11 berte, c 'est 
son jardin secret. petite connivence avec 
lui-m€me. Un type paresaeux et froid, un peu 
chimerique mais tres raisonnable au fond, qui s'est 
s<Jurnoisement c:mfectionne un me<Uocre et solide 
bonheur d'inertie et qui se justifie de temps en 
temps par des c·:msiderati:)ns elevees_." (AR. p.54) 
It is evident. even at this early stage of the book 
that Mathieu is already aware of the dryness and sterility 
of his life which his passion for analysis has created. 
He is beginning to see the emptiness of his n3tions of a 
" \ . / reasoned freedom. Je suis vieux. Me voila affole 
sur une chaise engage' jusqu'au cota dans ma vie et ne 
croyant ~ rien." (AR. p.54) He is dissatisfied with 
his life and rapidly losing faith in his quest for 
The events of the novel, which after all 
occur \i'Jithin a short, 48 hJur, period, merely serve to 
strengthen and confirm his growing disillusionment to the 
point where he is forced· t~ admit that he has indeed 
attained "the age of reason." 
When the pressures of an external reality suddenly 
threaten to invade his intellectual life where he so 
carefully cultivates his "freedom", Mathieu tries to 
convince himself that at all costs he must preserve thi~ 
freedom. However, as these pressures recede from him 
with equal suddenness as the matter is put entirely out 
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of his control, he is obliged tJ realize that his self-
questi~ning and analysing were to no purpose. At the end 
Jf the b~ok he is alone. He bas lost Marcelle~ the only 
3therreing w1 th whom he shared any degree of communication; 
he has passed beyond his infatuation with Ivich who is 
returning to her home in the pr"JVinces; he is m:>re than 
ever estranged from his Jne-time friends Daniel and Brunet~ 
and also of course from his brother. Jaques.~ He is 
entirely alone, and, like Roquentin in La Naus6e, he has 
experienced the ~othingness which is at the centre of his 
existence, thereby disc~vering that what he had thought 
to be the way tJ freedom was but an illusion. 
"Pour rien: cette vie lui etait donnee pour 
rien, 11 n'6tait rien et cependent il ne 
changerait plus: il etait fait." (AR. p.319) 
With a mixture of boredom and bitterness be accepts that 
he has finished with his youth (and the idealism which 
acc·:>mpanied it), admitting that, in Jaques phrase, he has 
attained the "age of reason." 
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CHAPTER IV 
LE SURSIS 
In L'Age de Raison politics and world events remained 
incidental to the personal themes developed in the novel. 
Certainly Mathieu's sense of' shame and P;Uilt at not 
fighting in the Spanish Civil War is constantly present 
in his mind throughout the book, but apart from him, the 
characters show little concern with political considerations 
except for Brunet, the Communist Party member, and the 
Spanish Gomez, both ::>f' whom make only brief appearances. 
By c :mtrast, in Le Sure is pol! tics suddenly intrude upon 
the private lives and thoughts of every individual as the 
Munich crisis of 19~8 brings the threat of war. 
Not only are the characters of the previous volume of 
the novel sequence carried over into this, the second, 
volume, but a whole host of additional characters is 
introduced to create a vast panorama of individuals caught 
up in the universal upheaval of political crisis. As if 
to reinforce this idea of universality
1
actual historical 
figures are intermingled with the fictional characters 
and the peaple, whose lives we glimpse as they are affected 
in different ways by the collective destiny, comprise an 
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extensive range of personalities. If in L'Age de Raison 
Sartre was c~ncerned basically with only one type of 
character - that Jf the rather bohemian intellectual -
in Le Sursis he skilfully sketches a large number of 
characters very different in type, ranging fr~m Gros 
Louis, the illiterate, simple-minded shepherd from the 
Cevennes, who cannot comprehend the circumstances which 
enmesh his life; tJ Philippe, pacifist and poet; the 
cowardly Pierre; Charles, a pathetic invalid; and 
ordinary Czecks and Germans involved in the dispute. 
In an article in 194h Sartre said that while reading 
a b-:>ok by Dos Pass>Js he conceived the idea of "weaving a 
novel out of various simultaneous lives, with characters 
who pass each other without ever knowing one another and 
whCJ all contribute t·o the formation of the atm>Jsphere of a 
m::>ment of a historical period." ( 1 ) Thus all the 
· individual consciousnesses represented in Le Sursis are 
seen as unified by their collective situation. To express 
this and to unite a multitude of characters and incidents, 
major and minor, and to link far-flung locations, Sartre 
has adopted the technique of simultaneity used by John 
Dos Passos in Manhattan Transfer and the U.S.A. trilogy. (2) 
The Juxtaposition of people and places, and the rapid, 
unexplained transitions of the narrative from one indiVidual 
or group to another and from one situation to another, which 
comprise this technique are not to be achieved easily. 
In the hands ot a lees able writer the result might well 
have been bewilderment on the part of the reader and a 
disappointing sense of confusion and lack of any controlling 
unity. In Le Sureis the theme of a universal threat of 
wa:r:• which modifies the life and attitudes of each individual 
in a particular way, provides a strong unifying element 
for the novel. Indeed the simultaneous technique is 
admirably suited to capture the extent of the mounting 
tension of the pre-war situation, while at the same time. 
the rapid transitions among a range of people and places 
hint at the confusion which the situation creates in the 
minds of many who are directly or indirectly lnvolved. and 
the social and personal upheaval which will inevitably 
result when war does come. 
An accomplished manipulator of words and dialo~ue, 
Sartre displays his apparent mastery of this style or 
writing, although it certainly demands the reader's close 
attention and constant alertness in order to follow 
through the abrupt changes from one consciousness to 
77. 
another. sometimes even in mid-sentence. A good 
example of how Sartre ~ses this simultaneity to reflect 
the same event in the minds of a number ot people at the 
same time is to be fo~nd in the case where different 
characters are listening to the radio broadcast of 
Hitler's speech on the evening of the 26th September. 
Accompanying the usual Juxtaposition of places. a linking 
narration takes a stream of consciousness form to which 
contribute the simultaneous tho~ghts and emotions of 
different people who are at the same time sharing the 
Thus the 
narration flashes fr.::.~m the thoughts of one of H1tle:r•s 
soldiers. to those of a Jewess longing to kill Hitler. 
then includes a snatch of Hitler's speech. passes to 
Philippe's mental resabitione not to participate in the 
war. and finally to the words of Gomez in Spain: 
"Non Fuhrer. mon Fuhrer. tu parles et Je suis 
change en pierre, Je ne pense plus, Je ne veux 
plus :r1en. Je ne suie que ta vo1x. Je l'atten-
d:ra!s a la sortie• Je le V1sera1s au coeur, 
mais Je suis en premier lieu le porte-parole 
des Allemands et c'est pour cea Allemands que 
j 1a! parl~, assurant que Je ne suis plus dispos~ • 
rester epectateur inactif et calme alors que ce 
dement de Prague croit pouvoir, Je serai ce , 
martyr, Je ne suis pas part! pour la Suisse. a 
pr.sent je ne pe~ plus rien fa!re qu'endurer ce 
martyre. Je Jure d 1etre ce martJr, Je .Jure, Je 
Jure, je jure, chut. dit Gomez, nous ~co~tons 
le discours du pantin.~ (s. pp. 264-265) 
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Each one reacts differently, just as each of their lives 
is affected differently by the historical situation in 
which they find themselves confronted with the imminence 
of war. 
Sartre 1a fascinated by his new "simultaneous" style 
which affords him ample opportunity to experiment and to 
display his technical virtuosity in usin~ words. Unlike 
the style of La Naus6e or L~Age de Raison, which allowed 
the reader to peruse in some detail and at length the 
acta, thoughts, and changing attitudes of the characters, 
the technique of simultaneity allows, by comparison, only 
fleeting glimpses of the character of particular instances. 
Quite apart from these stylistic considerations, Sartre's main 
thematic preoccupation is to reveal the impact the political 
crisis has on each individual. 
For these reasons it is hardly too surprising to find 
that the theme of personal freedom, which was embarked 
upon in the first volume of the cycle, is temporarily 
subjugated to the theme of the effects of the historical 
situation. This is not to say that it is entirely 
submerged or forgotten, for, although suspended for a 
time, it reappears towards the end of the book when again 
Sartret takes up the more personal philosophic themes to 
carry the plot of the first volume f:)rward in the 
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sequence. But, on account of the theme developed in 
Le Sursis, a new dimension has been added to the problem 
of one '1 S search for freedom. 
Towards the end of L1Age de Raison Mathieu had 
commented to Daniel that in six months' time he would be 
exactly the same as he was the~, (3) and in Le sursis 
we find him little changed. For all his ironical claim 
to have attained "the age of reason" he is just a little 
older, not more mature. He is still deceiving himself, 
still obsessed with a desire for an elusive "libert'" and 
apparently no further advanced towards achieving his 
goal. He is still uncommitted to anything, still 
irresolute and seemingly incapable of positive acti·:m .. 
Just as when considering marriage to Marcelle he hesitated 
so long that when he did finally reach a decision he was 
powerless to implement it, the situation having passed 
entirely from his control; so he spends too long trying 
to make up his mind whether or not to have an affair 
with Odette, his brother's wife, and once again events 
over-take him. This time his mobilization papers call 
him away to Paris and one more episode in his life is 
relegated to the file marked "occasions manqu~es." 
But when the political situation erupts into a 
crisis in which all are involved a whole new area of 
possibility is opened up. not just for Mathieu but for 
everyone. In an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty 
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the private destiny of each individual becomes uncertain. 
No•one can count on what his future will be and because 
it is indefinite it is full of possibility. The immediate 
likelihood of war disorients everything and the perspective 
which the characters had of their future. present. and 
past is altered accordingly. Robert Campbell (4 ) points 
out that a metamorphosis occurs in the consciousness of 
those who are to be mobilized and they judge the preceding 
years, not in the light of having lived through them, but 
in terms of the probable future. 
"Il regardai t ces vingt annees qu 111 avait vecues 
etales. ensoleillees. une plaine marine et il les 
voyait a present comme elles avaient ete: un 
nombre fini de journees comprimees entre deux 
haute murs sans espoir, une periode cataloguee, 
avec un debut et une fin, qui figurerait dans 
les manuals d'histoire sous le nom d'Entre-
deux-guerres. Vingt ana: 1918•1938. Seule• 
ment vingt ana~ Hier 9a semblait a la fois 
plus court et plus long: de toute fagon on 
n'aurait pas eu 1 1idee de compter, puisque pa 
n'etait pas termine. A present. c'eat terminEr. 
a'etait un faux avenir. Tout ce qu'on a vecu 
depuis vingt ana, on l'a vecu a faux." (s. p.t7f) 
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Not only does the bist~rical past become "contaminated 
by the future" (5) but the past life of each individual 
is also affected. It becomes as if detached and 
impersonal, falsified by the future: 
11 Ils etaient tous 1~, enferme's, morts, Marcelle, 
Ivich, Brunet, Boris, Daniel. Ils y ~talent 
venus, ils s'~ etaient pris, ils y resteraient. 
Lea coleres d Ivich, lea remontrances de Brunet, 
Mathieu s'en souvenait deja comme de la morte de 
Louis XVI, avec la meme impartialit~. Elles 
appartenaient au pass~ du monde, pas au sien: 
11 n 'avait plus de passe:(." {s. p.279) 
Disoriented from the past the characters are obliged to 
construct an imaginable future for themselves. The 
threat of war engulfing the individual who is totally 
impotent against it, allows Mathieu to look back in 
bitterness at his futile search.for a false freedom. 
While crossing the Pont Neuf he realizes his mistake 
with sudden clarity. The semblance of freedom which he 
had tried to create by refusing all ties is a comforting 
but empty shell; real liberty is "une plenitude." The 
emotional and physical sensations which he,experiences 
at this point are strongly reminiscent of Roquentin's 
flashes of awareness of the nature of the existence of 
external obJects and his experience of th~ Nausea. 
'· 
"Dehors. Tout est dehors ••••• Au dedans, rien, 
p88 meme Une fum6e 1 il n ly a paS de dedans, 
11 n 'y a r1en. Moi: rien. Je suis libre, 
ee dit-11, la bouche seche." (s. p.295) 
This leads him to the ironical discovery that: 
:i~!t~t!i~e~i6prg:h! ':!e c~:r~:':o~!:~s 1~!~· 
la volr, que 'je ne peux pas la toucher1 elle n 'e"talt que mo1. Je suis tna liberte'. • (s. p.295) 
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He and his freedom are one and yet he doesn't know 
how to use it: 
"Qu'est-ce que je vais faire de toute cette 
libert6? Qu'eat•ce que je vais faire de 
mol?" ( s. p,. 296) 
Wearily he realizes: "Je aula libre pour rien. '' 
( s. p. 296) 
Somehow he must put his liberty to the test. The 
immediate alternatives (partir, rester, fuir,) are not 
sufficient to jeopardise his liberty and he contemplates 
suicide. If he drowns himself in th~ Seine his liberty 
(which has become "1 'horrible, horrible liberte'' s. p. 297) 
would be anihilated too. His act ~•ould be "toute une 
loi, tout un choix, toute Ut'Ae morale" (s. p.,297). It 
would be an absolute. For a moment the water below 
appears to hold his future when suddenly: 
11 il d'cida de ne pas le faire. Il de'cida: 
"ce ne sera qu 'une e"preuve" ••••• Ce sera pour 
la prochaine fois." (8. p. 297) 
This may be interpreted as indicative that Mathieu 
is still as incapable of resolute action as he ever was. 
But I think it is significant that Sartre should have 
worded the episode in such a way as to shift the emphasis 
to the idea that Mathieu's decision is the decision E21 
to commit suicide. Perhaps the clue to this decision 
lies in the lines: 
"Il n 'avait pas de raison particuli~re pour se 
laisser couler, mais il n'avait pas non plus 
de raison pour s 'empecher." {s. p.297) 
Mathieu, refusing any Gidean notion of an "acte 
gratuit 11 , needs a reason for his action, one way or 
another, and more especially a reason to, than a reason 
-
not to. Since he has n~ reason to commit suicide the 
only reason which could prevent him from it is that, if he 
refuses the limited "future" of death, his future is still 
one of possibility in which he may be able to apply his 
newly-gained insi~ht as to the nature of his freedom. 
A little later, in the train, Mathieu appears to be 
looking forward to the new life which tomorrow holds 
for him, his past mistakes having been buried along with 
his falsified past: 
"Mathieu eut un sursaut de joie: c 'eta! t fini. 
:Qemai~, Nancy, la Quer•re, la Ji)eur, la mort 
peut~etre, la 11be~t6. "N~ua ~llons t)ir, 
dit-11. NJUB allcms voir."'~ · · (s. p.327) 
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Mathieu finds in his pJcket Daniel's letter telling 
him Jr his conversion to reli~ion. For Daniel, bu1~ened 
with the ~ruilt and shame of his homosexuality, has been 
unable to attain the self-coincidence with his·vice which 
might ~ive him peace of mind, since he cannot either love or 
hate himself sufficiently: 
"Jeai s')uvent souhaite me halr •••• Mala cette heine 
••••• se noya1t dans mon inconeistance ••••• Je ne 
pouvais pas m'aimer non plus - J'en euis sur, 
bien que je ne l'aie jamais tent&." ( s. p. 329) 
Nor has he found any expiation in his role as Marcelle's 
"arch-angel". He finds comfort, however, in the notion 
of a God who knows all and sees all. 
Another of the characters carried over from L'Age de 
Raison is Brunet, who sincerely wants the war to begin 
but is still struggling with his background of bourgeois and 
intellectual origins which prevent his total acceptance by 
the workers. 
A future threatened by war also affects decisions 
made by Boris and Ivich. For Boris the events seem to 
be fulfilling the destiny he believes is his. 
"Personnellement Boris n 'avait Jamais dout( 
qu'elle ne finiase par ~later; 11 l'avait 
attendue comma un prince her1t1er qui sait, des 
son enfance, qu til est nf{ pour re~ner. " 
lS. p.274) 
Assuming this he signs up r~r three years in the army, a 
decision he is to regret when the crisis does not result 
in immediate war. Likewise Ivich, also believing that 
war will be declared, runs away fr:"Jm Laon to sleep with 
her boy-friend in Paris, an action which loses all 
meaning for her when war does not come. 
But the tide of crisis recedes abruptly when the 
Munich agreement is reached. The nations and the 
individuals are granted a temporary "reprieve". The 
future they have anticipated is taken away from them and 
they are left to reconstruct their lives in terms of 
the past once again. For many of them, like those in 
the crowd waiting upon Daladier's return, the relief they 
feel is self-deception - the 1918-19;!8 period has been a 
prelude to war, and war will come. 
For others, Boris, Ivich, Brunet, and particularly 
Mathieu, there is regret and a strong sense of having been 
cheated as once more they have to pick up the pieces of 
their former lives. 
""c'est la ~ourne'e des dupes". pensa•t•il ••••• 
Et ma vie a mo1, qu'est-oe que je vais en 
faire?" c'e'tait tout s1mple ••••• Il 
rentrerait chez lui. 11 mettrait la cle dans 
la serrure; ••••• Et rienne se serait passe. 
Rien du tout ••••• il ne resterait plus que ••• 
le souvenir d'une nuit oll 11 avait cru partir 
a la guerra... (s. p.361) 
Mathieu's reaction is one of angry non-acceptance: 
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"Je ne veux pas, pensa-t-11 en serrant lea 
barreaux de toates sea forces. Je ne veux pas: 
Cela na sera pas:" ••••• N81mporte qui; n'importe ou. 
Il ne possedait plus r1en, 11 n 'etait plus rien. 
La nuit sombre de l'avante-veille ne serait pas 
perdue, cet enorme remue-menage ne serait pas tout 
a fait inutile •••• "Qu 1ils fassent leur guerre, 
qu'ils ne la fassent pas, je m'en mo~ue; je ne 
suis pas dupe ••••• Je resterai libre,' pensa-t-11." (s. pp.361-362) 
Taken overall the themes combined in Le Sursis 
point to the impossibility of trying to exert personal 
freedom in a vacuum, ignoring an historical or social 
context. Man is in fact controlled by the circumstances 
of his life and yet is free to adopt whatever attitude 
he chooses towards them. And the circumstances are not 
stable so that the course of an individual life cannot be. 
Mathieu may be able to conceive of a deliberately lived 
life but he cannot bring it into being. 
CHAPTER V 
LA MORT DANS L'AME 
The reprieve of the Munich conference only served 
to delay the war, not avert it, and La Mort dans l'Ame, 
the third published volume of the novel series, covers 
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the period of the French defeat. Specifically the action 
of the novel takes place over the space of a few days, 
from 15th to 18th June, 1940. 
Sartre is not concerned here tJ show the effects of 
the defeat of France in the way he described the effects 
of the Munich conference in the preceding novel. The 
reactions of the characters to events of the period a1~ 
related but his primary objective is to resume following 
through the lives of the characters up to this point. 
For these r•easons there is a marked difference in style 
between these two books although they are closely allied 
by the importance assumed in the novels by the historical 
situation. In La Mort dans l'Ame there are traces 
reminiscent of the style of Le Sursis, particularly in 
the linking of distant locations at a moment of time, 
but Sartre largely renounces the frequent and rapid 
88. 
transitions from ~ne set of characters to another. In 
many cases the time and place ~a specified in a sort of 
chapter heading. He allows the characters to appear 
for longer periods at a time, permitting their reactions 
to the impact of historical events to be observed at 
greater length and without interruption since there is 
more continuity within each chapter. 
Instead of trying to incorporate a vast number of 
characters, as in Le Sursis, La Mort dans l'Ame concentrates 
on relatively few, taking the time to examine more fully 
the lives and individual problems of the principal 
characters. Some of the minor characters introduced in 
previous volumes continue to be followed up in this novel 
although their appearances are briefer. For instance there 
is Philippe, the pacifist, still lacking the courage to 
act upon his convictions, who encounters Daniel and whose 
life becomes involved with his. Marcelle does not 
actually appear in the novel but we learn that she and her 
baby are safe in Dax. Ivich has meantime married her 
lover and is living with her husband's parents whom she 
cannot bear. Boris has become a determined soldier. 
But most of the book centres on the three major characters • 
Daniel, Mathieu and Brunet. 
When we last left Daniel he appeared t) have found a 
s~lution fJr his problem ~f guilt and inability t~ 
accept himself aF! a homosexual. But ~vidently his 
conversi:.:m to religion was Just another piece of self-
deception and,. a~ Maurice cranston phrases it: "his 
religion turns out to be just as much a fraud as his 
marria,.e." (1 ) 
A non7combattant, he is in Paris at the time of the 
arrival of the Ge~man troops. Philip Thody points out 
that: "He 1[~ delighted sexually by the beauty of the 
German soldiers and philosophically by the triumph they 
represent ·::>f Evil over Good. n ( 2 ) Also, the taking of 
Paris provides him ~dth the justificati::m he seeks to 
relieve his ~uilt. He has looked ::m triumphantly as 
those who had cJndemned him as a homosexual, fled in 
panic before the advancing German army. 
" ••• un proc~s en cours depuis vingt ans, des 
espions jusque sous son lit; chaque passant, 
c'etait un temo:l.n & charge ou un Juge ou les 
deux; tout ce qu'il disait pouvait @tre 
retenu contre lui. Et puis, d'un seul coup, 
la debandade. lls courent, les tem::>ins, les juges, les h,:>mmes de bien, ils ce>urent ••••••• 
Moi, le Coupable, Je r~gne sur leur ville." 
(M.A. pp. 82-83) 
In the near-deserted streets of Paris he sees the 
y:>ung Philippe and is at Jnce attracted by him. Philippe 
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is trying tJ summon his nerve in order to drown himself 
in the Seine when Daniel intervenes and engages him in 
c·.mversati::m. Delighting in "la l:mgue patience 
p'de:rastique" which he has experienced B'J often before, 
Daniel takes the boy back to his apartment, but thi [! c 
time there is n'J accompanying sense of guilt. He plans 
t·::> initiate Philippe into the systematic derangement of 
the senses as advocated by Rimbaud but at this point the 
novel leaves them. We do not know how their relationship 
devel':>Ps and n'Jr d:> we kn:rw if Daniel has really found a 
soluti'Jn t::> hie problem. 
Apart from this further look at Daniel's life, 
La M':::lrt dans l'Ame revolved in the main around Mathieu and 
Brunet. Structurally the novel falls into tV'JO divisi::>ns 
with Mathieu as the central figure :;f the first part, and 
Brunet assuming increasing significance as his r•ole as 
the main protagonist is devel::>ped in the latter part 'Jf 
the bo::>k, 
Mathieu is a private in a French :r•egiment which has 
been retreating before the advancing German tr):>ps. In 
the dis:>rganisation :>f the retreat the :>fficers have 
deserted and Mathieu finds himself in a small French 
village w1th :>ther soldiers. The demJralised men get 
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drunk as they await the final humiliati n - The Armistice. 
But also in the village is a small group 0f Chasseurs, 
first-class soldiers whose patri~tism and pride in 
themselves rule out any likelih~od of them not fighting 
to the end, regardless of the odds against them and the 
futility of their resistance with the Armistice so near 
at hand. 
"Si tu es chasseur, tu te bats." (M.A. p.173) 
Mathieu and another fDldier, rather than get drunk 
and await capture with the rest Jf their regiment, Join 
these resisters in a last stand. The suicide squad takes 
up its posltiJn in the belfry of a tower which overlooke 
the road down 11Jhich the Germans will advance. As he 
waits for the enemy's arrival and kno~1s that his defiance 
will prove futile, Mathieu ponders one last questi::m. He 
thinks: "Je vais mourir pour rien" and then wonders 
anxiouely: " ai-je le droit de mourir pour rien?" (M.A. p.178) 
His question echoes his awareness )f the absurdity of the 
action he is about to take. Angrily he makes his decision: 
"Tant pis pour ceux d 'en dessous, tant pis p:)ur 
t0ut le m)nde. Finis lea remords, lea r6aerves, 
les restrictions: personne n'est mon Juge, 
persJnne ne pense ~ mol, persJnne ne se SJUViendra 
de mJi, personne ne peut d~cider pour mo1 ••••••• 
Je decide que la mort etait le sena secret 
de ma vie, que j'ai vecu pour mourir; je 
meurs pour te'm·::>ignei• qu 1il est impossible 
de Vi vre; mea yeux eteindr::>nt le ltl)nde et 
le fermerant p·our touj::>urs." (M.A. p.178) 
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He refuses any temptation to regard his decision to resist 
rather than to remain, safe and passive, in the cellar 
be low, as an act of romantic heroism. The irrev::>cable 
consequences 'Jf his decision are to express revolt against 
the futility of his life and his false "liberte". For 
the first time the ineffectual Mathieu finds himself 
committed to a course of action and his whJle bein becomes 
intent upon putting up fifteen minutes of resistance, 
knowing all along that it is in vain. As he fires shot 
after shot in a frenzy of violence he takes glorious 
and spectacular revenge for all his past heaitati~ns and 
failures. 
"Il s'approcha du parapet et se mit~ tirer 
debout. c'~tait une en~rme revanche; 
chaque coup de feu le vengeait d 9un ancien scru-
pule. "Un coup sur L::>la ~ue je n '~i pas ::>se v::>ler, 
un coup sur Marcelle que j aurais du plaque:r, un 
coup sur Odette que Je n'al pas VJUlu baiser. 
Celui-ci p::>ur les livres que je n 'ai pas ose 
ecrire, celui-la pour lee voyages que je me suis 
refuse"s, cet autre sur tous les types, en bl::>c, 
que J'avais envie de d~tester et que j'ai essay€ 
de comprendre." Il tirait, les lois volaient en 
1 'air, tu aime:ras t·on prochein comme to1-m@me, 
pan dans cette gueule de con, tu ne tueras point, 
pan sur le f'aux jeton d 'en face. Il t1ra1 t sur 
l'homme, sur la Vertu, sur le Monda: la Libert~ 
c'est la Terreur; le feu brulait dans la 
A A 
mairie, brulait dans sa tete: lea balles 
sifflaient, libre comme 1 1air, le monde sautera, 
moi avec, il tira, il regarda sa montre: 
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quatorze minutes trente secondes; il n'avait 
plus rien a demander sauf un delai d'une demi-
minute, juste le temps de tirer sur le bel 
officier si fier qui courait vera l'eglise; 1 il tira sur le bel officier, sur toute la Beaute de 
la Terre, sur la rue, sur les fleurs, sur les 1 jardins, sur tout ce qu'il avait aim?. La Beaute 
fit un plonge~~ obscene et Mathieu tira encore. 
Il tira: il etait pur1 il etait tout-puissant, 
il 6tait libre." {M.A. p.197) 
Despite the personal zest with which Sartre recounts 
this episode it would be erroneous to assume that he 
endorses Mathieu's discovery that "Liberty is Terror". 
The pitiful futility of the gesture and the impassioned 
rhetoric serve to emphasize the hollowness of Mathieu's 
motives. For Sartre the Hegelian concept of "terrorist 
liberty" is not true freedom. Mathieu does believing 
that he has at last found and asserted his freedom but 
in fact he has not discovered the meaning of true freedom, 
and Sartre intends us to see this as the last of Mathieu's 
many misconceptions about the nature of freedom. 
Naturally we assume that Mathieu is killed after his 
violent outburst of vengeance although Sartre's attitude 
is ambiguous at this point. Originally the climax to 
Mathieu's story was not to have been his death in this 
manner. In 1946 Sartre had said that Mathieu would find 
his salvation in the final volume where he was to "commit 
himself to a free commitment which will give the world a 
meaning for him." (3) Since it is unlikely that he would 
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attempt t0 revive Mathieu at this stage we must assume 
that his intentions had altered in the meantime, but in 
view of this the value and validity of Mathieu's final 
gesture is seriously undermined. 
With Mathieu thus disposed of, Brunet comes into the 
central spotlight and, in developing hi~ story in part 
tw0 of La Mort dans l 'Ame, Sartre appears t0 be embarkin'' 
on a more optimistic elaboration of his ideas on commit-
ment and personal freedom. 
While Mathieu is havin~ his iconoclastic moment of 
;''lory up on the tower, Brunet is in the same village 
awaiting his capture along with the other soldiers in 
the cellar. Miss Murdoch sums up the contrast between 
these two characters when she says: 
"Mathieu was in perpetual doubt, 
himself away without a reason. 
in any d ;ubt~ and nurses himself 
tasks • " ( 4 J 
and casts 
Brunet is never 
for future 
A dedicated member of the Communist party, Brunet is 
"one of those who think the question of liberty 
is solved in the Marxist definition of the word 
as \be recognition of necessity'." (5) 
Having resisted for as long as is practical, and believing 
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that it is senseless to be killed fighting a battle which 
is lost before it is begun, Brunet decides that the most 
logical course of action for him ie to surrender to the 
Germans. 
Whereas Mathieu acknowledged no reason to live, 
Brunet's political c-:-mvictions provide him v~ith a motive 
and he allows himself to be taken prisoner in ~rder to 
continue the work of the Communist Party in the prisoner 
of.' \IH3 r camps. 
As soon aa the soldiers have been rounded up in 
captivity he starts seeking out fellow Communist sympathizers 
in )rder to maintain their morale and impose on them and 
)n himself a disciplined Jrganisation in preparation for 
the time after the liberati~n. 
"Il regaroe a sa droite, ~ sa gauche, 11 se 
retourne, 11 cherche un visage pareil au 
sien parmi cette for~t de visages abandonn~s, 
ivres, tortur~s par une gatte irrepressible. Ou sont les camarades? Un communiste, 9a 
se reconna'lt au premier coup d' ceil. Un 
visage. Un seul visage dur et calme, un 
visage d'homme. 11 (M.A. p.208) 
The last pages of La Mort dans 1 9Ame are a vivid 
description of the captured French soldiers bein~ 
transferred to Germany. Brunet has been disappointed by 
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the characteristic attitude of apathy and lack of 
courageous conviction on the part of the average French 
pris:mer of war and, knowing that resistance will be 
more easily aroused and organized if the French soldiers 
are treated harshly Brunet is pleased when it becomes 
apparent that the train r .. ,h!ch many of the prisoners had 
thought ~t1as taking them home, is actually headed in the 
direction of Germany. 
It is stranp-e that Brunet should suddenly C':>me into 
prominence as the key figure of the novel series since 
he has hitherto made only brief appearances, not being 
given the chance t:) reveal himself by his words and 
actions to the same extent as other characters. The 
reader knows of him only as a staunch Communist Party 
supporter and erst-while friend ':)f Mathieu. So great is 
the change fr·om tNhat has g::me before that it almost seems 
as if the second part )f La Mort dans l'Ame should 
actually be the beginninr ,;}f another novel, about Brunet, 
and which is c~ncluded, as Antony Manser points out, (6 ) 
in the ext rae t "Dr'O le d 'Ami ti~" from the proJected fourth 
volume .. 
For some time Brunet seems a near caricature of the 
blithely devoted follower of the Communist Party. His 
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whole life is bound up with his political affiliations to 
the extent that he exists not in himself but in the Party. 
His resolute adherence to ita political values has 
enabled him to escape the anguish of moral choice. The 
contrast between him and Mathieu on this point is very 
marked. Mathieu, with his continual lucid self-question-
ing, is excessively subjective and too much concerned with 
himself. Brunet on the other hand is too c ::mvinced of 
the Party viewpoint to resort to doubt or questioning 
and thus the problem of moral choice does not arise for 
him. Freedom is Necessity, he believes, and desires no 
other definition. 
Where other people are concerned he does not see 
them in a subjective relationship but only in terms of 
the Party and therefore in his dealings with them he is 
coldly impersonal, an attitude which inhibits his forming 
any genuine relationship with them. 
A case in point concerns "le typo". The young 
man's name is Vernier but from the outset he is identified 
only as "le typo" since this is all the significance he 
has as far as Brunet is concerned. On their first 
meeting Brunet's thoughts are of the possible use the boy 
will be to his project. 
"Typo: une ~hance sur trois; je lui 
parlerai demain •••• le typo; probablement 
un Jeune camara~e." (M.A~ p.~20) 
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Later, on the train Brunet finds himself next to 
"le typo It in the Cramped Space Of the Wagon load Of men. 
\ 
Hearing him mention to Schneider that he is from Lyons, 
Brunet is embarrassed: 
"J'avais oubli€ qu'il etait de Lyon. Voii'a 
deux mois que je le fait travailler et je ne 
sais rien de lui. A present il est tout 
chaude contre moi, et il a le mal de pays." (M.A. p. 283) 
The youth, believing along with many others that he 
is going home, confides to Brunet that if it hadn't been 
for him he would have taken a chance. on escaping long 
ago, but: 
"Du moment qu 'il y avait un responsable, il 
faillai t bien que. je reste." Brunet ne 
r6pond pas. 11 pense: "Naturellement, 
c 'est a cause de moi." Mais ca ne lui fait 
aucun plaisir. (M.A. p.283')$ 
Brunet has realized that they are being taken to 
Germany and as they enter a tunnel tells him: 
"Si tu veux te tirer, c 'e.st le moment .••. 
Tu n'as qu'a sauter quand on serait dans 
le tunnel~ •••• saute •••• Mais saute done •••• 
(M.A. p.284) 
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But the youth, thinking the train is going to 
.When it is apparent that the train 
is taking them to Germany "le typo" contemplates trying 
t::> escape by jumping from the train. Brunet, watching 
him, realizes his intentions and takes a tight hold on 
him, wondering if he has the right to stop him. He. 
recognizes the suffering of the scared, desperate boy 
but cannot express his compassion because his emotional 
capacity is so limited since his frame of reference is 
not himeelf but always the Party. His thoughts at this 
moment show to what an extent his reactions as a person 
are determined by his C. P. conviction~3. 
"Brunet se sent drBle; il tlent dans sea 
mains cette depouille; un membre du Parti 
qui..ne peut plus servir. Il voudrait lui 
parler, l'exhorter, 1 9aider, il ne peut pas: 
sea mots aont au Part!, c 1eet le Parti qui leur 
a d::>rme leur sens; e 1 9inte(r1eur du Part!, 
Brunet peut aimer~ peut persuader et consoler. 
r~ typo est tombe hors de cet immense fuseau 
de lumiere, Brunet n'a plus rien a lui dire. 
Pourtant il souffre encore, ce mome. Crever 
pour crever ••• Ah! qu'il decide: Tant mieux 
pour lui s'il s'en tire; s'il y reate, sa mort 
servira." (M.A. p.296) 
The boy tricks Brunet into releasing his grip and 
jumps. Instead of making for the embankment he panics 
and tries t:> climb back :>n the moving train. Terrified 
he calls Brunet's name and as Brunet reaches for him the 
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German guards shoot down "le typo" at the precise moment 
their hands touch. Although angered Brunet subdues his 
personal feelings to control the anger of the rest of the 
men with the help of Schneider. 
ttBrunet voit vingt paires d'yeux pleins de 
meurtre: ••• Brunet volt toute cette haine, 
sa haine, son outil et 11 a peur." (M.A. p.297) 
- -
The strength of their hatred frightens him even though he 
realizes that the success of his purpose depends on it. 
Brunet senses: nils n'oublieront plus. c'est gagne." 
(M.A. p.297) 
In the turmoil of his thoughts and feelings, his 
physical discomfort accentuating his spiritual unease, 
Brunet seeks the reassurance of Schneider's presence. 
Rather pathetically, the human side of Brunet's nature is at 
last revealed in this closing scene of the novel. He 
no longer appears as the coldly impersonal Party puppet 
but as an ordinary human being who needs the warmth of 
communion with another human being. 
"Il a mal, il respire mal ••••• Il appelle ~ voix 
basse: "Schneider! Schneider! 
- Je suis 11, "dit Schneider. Une main prend 
sa main et la serre. "C'est toi, Schneider? 
... Oui.n Ils se taisent, cf>te ~ c$te, la main 
dans la main ••••• Brusquement Schneider retire sa 
main, Brunet veut la retenir mais Schneider se 
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degage d'une secousse et se dilue dans lenoir. 
Brunet reate seule et raide, inconfortable, 
dans une chaleur de four." (M.A. pp.297-298) 
Despite their opposing attitudes and personalities 
there is a certain rapport between these two from the 
outset. To Brunet Schneider is an enigmatic figure. 
intellectual, he appears to know a good deal about 
.An 
Communism and yet Brunet is unsure about him. He cannot 
categorise Schneider as he can thd other men in the prison 
camp whom he takes the self-imposed responsibility of 
organising. Schneider takes a rather ironical attitude 
towards Brunet's zealous activity and, since he is less 
naive than Brunet, tries to undermine his faith in the 
Party - perhaps to prepare him for disillusionment. But 
in spite of their differences, maybe because of them, 
Schneider is the only person with whom Brunet has been able 
to ~stablish the beginnings of any sort of genuine 
sympathetic relationship and it is this friendship which 
is to be developed further in "Dr~le d '.Amiti~." 
CHAPTER VI 
LES CHEMINS DE LA LIBERTE 
These three novels discussed in the preceding pages 
comprise the Chemins de la Libert~ series as it stands. 
But before we go on to discuss the relevance of these 
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three novels to the whole, uncompleted, project we should, 
in fairness, look at the published fragment of the 
intended fourth and fina 1 volume La Derni~re Chance ( 1 ) 
since "Drble dtAmiti~" as previously mentioned (2 ) provides 
the conclusion to the story of Brunet and Schneider taken 
up in the second part of La Mort dans l'Ame. 
As Brunet's friendship with the disillusioned 
Schneider develops his unquestioning acceptance of the 
Communist Party credo is increasingly undermined. With 
the arrival in the camp of a senior comrade it is revealed 
that Schneider is in fact a distrusted ex~Party member, 
Vicarios, fo~merly a Communist journalist in North Africa 
who had denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 and left 
the Party in protest. Not only is Brunet's friendship 
with Schneider endangered by this discovery but also 
everything he has striven to establish among the men in 
the prison camp is rendered void when Schneider's 
predictions about political events are verified and the 
extent of Russian-German co-operation becomes apparent. 
Brunet tries to adapt to the new Party-line but his 
confidence in its infallibility is destroyed. Full of 
doubts he now begins to see the Party from a more 
objective point of view. 
"If the Party is right, I am more lonely than 
a madman. If the Party is wron~, all men are 
alone and the world is done for. (3) 
His doubt combined with his strong affection for the 
discredited Vicarios prompt him to try and escape with 
him. Just as they reach the outside of the barbed wire 
the alarm is sounded and Brunet realizes that other 
Communists in the camp have betrayed them to the Germans. 
Vicarios is shot and dies in Brunet's arms. 
"It's the Party that's killed me," Vicarios said, 
Brunet murmured: "let him not die." But he knew 
that Vicarios was dying..... No power of man 
could efface that absolute of suffering. It was 
the Party which had killed him. Even if the 
Soviet Union won, men were alone. Brunet leaned 
forward; he plunged his hand in Vicarios's dirty 
hair, and cried as if he might yet palliate the 
horror, as if two lost men could, at the last 
moment, conquer solitude. "To hell with the 
Party! You are my only friend." Vicarios did 
not hear ....... (4) 
Thus we leave Brunet intellectually and emotionally 
anguished. He has been forced to recognize t.he facts 
of human solitude. and suffering from which his resolut .. e 
activity in the Party had formerly shielded him. Not 
only is his strict allegiance to the ready-made values 
of the Communist Party gone, and the support this gave 
him dashed from under him, but his one valid personal 
relationship, which had developed at the expense of his 
faith and compensated for its loss, bas been destroyed. 
' The fragment ends with Brunet walking back towards the 
approaching camp guards, contemplating the anguish of the 
lifetime of despair which confronts him now that his 
belief in the Party has disintegrated and his only friend, 
Vicarios, is dead. 
It is at this point then that we have the sum total 
of Les Chemins de la Liberte' as Sartre lef.t it. If we 
can assume from the title that his intention is to point 
out to his readers in what direction the road to freedom 
lies, then he does not appear to' have succeeped. Rather, 
in investigating Vari9US possible roa,ds taken by the 
characters in the novels, he has indicated to us those 
roads which do ~ lead to freedom. 
To Daniel, in L1Age de Raison, freedom means doing the 
opposite to what one wishes. This negative approach to 
freedom is surely valid for Daniel orily because his is 
a particular kind of psychology and this definition 
expresses his extreme guilt and desire for humiliation 
and punishment. In Le Sursis he finds no lasting consolation 
in adopting a religious ••salvation" from his problem, 
although his guilt is temporarily appeased by his awareness 
of being constantly observed and judged by an omniscient 
God. By the third volume of the cycle he has rejected this, 
finding a justification for not feeling guilty about being 
what he is when the Germans occupy Paris for symbolically 
Evil has triumphed over'Good. Daniel sees routed those 
whom he hates for their "normalit~" and no longer carries 
a burden of guilt when continuing his homosexual existence. 
But because his justification does not come from within 
himself (any more than he can accept his homosexuality from 
within himself), we may presume it will not be permanent 
and since we hear no more of Dan.tel or his relationship 
with the hapless Philippe, his problem is given no 
solution and his "freedom" has not been established by the 
author in the novel sequence. 
Nor is the road to freedom to be found in the rootless 
freedom of Mathieu in Lt.Age de Raison, a carefully 
premeditated sort of '"disponibilit6", refusing to take 
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into account exterior factors and resulting only in the 
evasion of all responsibilities. · The superficial "freedom" 
which Mathieu believes he has cultivated at this stage 
is merely an unproductive parody of real freedom, which, 
Sartre iritimates, lies n6t in passive receptivity but 
irl active commitment. 
Mathieu in Le Sursis seems to arrive at the realisation 
that he cannot cultivate his personal freedom independently 
of external events, as the extremes of the historical 
situation point out for him a future of possibility in action. 
But when the situation returns to what it was before the 
crisis he resumes his former attitudes along with his way 
of life and when the likelihood of war becomes a reality, 
in La Mort dans l'Ame, his insight in this respect appears 
to have faded. 
In his outburst of self-declaration in his suicidal 
defence against the oncoming German soldiers, Mathieu 
enjoys an illumination of another kind of freedom. With 
a vengeance he metaphorically destroys each of his past 
illusions as he fires shot after shot in the bitterness of 
self-reproach and in his release identifies Liberty with 
Terror. This is action, violent action, but because of 
its totallyiconoclastia and self-destroying nature it 
is impractical as a means of exerting one's personal 
freedom~ ·Mathieu when·last we see him has exchanged 
one false image of liberty for another. 
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Following this episode there remains only Brunet to lead 
us down the road to freedom. He is totally committed 
politically to the Communist Party, and this in itself· is 
promising in the light of his author's leftist sympathies 6 
but as has been mentioned already, (5) his unhesitating, 
unquestioning acceptance of its values as his own, has 
allowed him to escape, very easily, from the anguish of 
having to face a moral choice. He has not therefore, in 
Sartre's view, created his freedom. Nevertheless he does 
receive a very s.ympat})etic treatment from his author, 
especially as.a contrast to Mathieu in volume one where 
Mathieu himself envies Brunet his 11 freedom" of being at 
one with the Party and with himself. 
It is in the third volume and the fragment of the 
fourth that Brunet becomes the central figure of the 
sequence and the question of whether or not his political 
conviction can a.onstitute his freedom is elaborated. 
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Although his intentions in organising his prisoner-
of·war comrades and keeping Party morale high in the face 
of adversity &a commendable, his attitude is portrayed 
as impersonal and somewhat insensitive. The men he 
gathers together are seen, both by him and by the author, 
as a group rather than as individuals. 
Only with the advent of his developing friendship 
with Schneider does Brunet display the firstzeal signs 
of "human" warmth and emotion. His nature is mellowed 
by this rapport with another person and for the first time 
in any of his novels Sartre manages to convey the sense 
of affection, understanding, respect and companionship 
which combine to create an intimate and truly sympathetic 
relationship between two characters. All other "pairs" 
in his fiction - Roquentin/Anny, Mathieu/Marcelle, 
Mathieu/Ivich, Mathieu/Odette, Marcelle/Daniel, Boris/Lola, 
Odette/Jacques - have been sadly mis-matched in this 
respect, with no real communication possible between them. 
The one exception is perhaps the curious brother/sister 
combination of Boris and Ivich. Admittedly all of these 
are relationships between men and women so that comparison 
is perhaps unjustified, but they all serve to illustrate 
the theories expounded in L'Etre.et le N~ant that the 
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essence of relationships between conscious beings is 
based on conflict rather than on community and that mutual 
recognition of each other's freedom is impossible. 
The third volume, then, concludes on a note of 
relative optimism despite the physical conditions of the 
story .. It appears that the two directions in which Brunet 
is developing may be headed towards providing a satisfactory 
answer to some of the many questions raised in the novels. 
On the one hand, the introduction of the theme of a genuine 
mutual friendship between Schneider and Brunet is inspiring 
since it adds a new and favourable dimension to the latter. 
On the other hand his political conviction is still firm 
enough not to have been undermined too seriously by 
Schneider's ironical disillusionment. 
But all hope is dashed in the two chapters of the 
fourth volume with Brunet's discovery of despair when his 
growing disillusionment is finalized by his betrayal by 
the Party to which he has devoted his life and when, 
deprived of the one personal relationship which ever 
mattered to him, he learns about the human situation of 
solitude. On his "road to freedom'• Brunet has travelled 
from confident optimism to disillusionment in the political 
context, while the counterbalancing development of his 
sharing with another a mutual friendship and understanding, 
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increasing proportionally as his unquestioning acceptance 
of the Party diminishes, is tragically terminated by the 
death of Vicarios. There is no solution to his despair 
in sight as the novel sequence now stands. 
Where then does the road to freedom lie? Evidently 
there can be no one way, for each individual must discover 
-
the way which is his own. ~ut the various roads taken by 
the characters in the novels have been investigated and 
have proved to be dead-ends. Apparently none of these 
ways is, in Sartre's view, a right way. How then is the 
elusive goal of "freedom" to be attained? The question 
receives no answer in the analyses put forward in the 
novels although, as Cranston suggests, "perhaps the reader 
will have learned something, by a process of contradiction 
and elimination, about that direction in which Sartre ~ 
think the road to freedom lies." (6 ) 
Nevertheless, the pattern which emerges from Les Chemins 
de la Libert6 is predominantly a negative one. The 
characters are defeated by life and in their despair find 
no satisfactory way out of their dilemma. Having rejected 
the aesthetic solution proposed at the end of La Naus~e, 
Sartre apparently set out to show in his next novels how 
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the existential consciousness could create a meaning for 
his life. But although Sartre. specifically in his non~ 
fictional writings and here implicitly, advocates a 
solution which lies in authentic commitment and action, 
tes Chemins de la Libert' seems to reveal only the 
impossibility of meaningful action:. Therefore the 
confident title of the series is' unjustified and the 
"roads to freedom" have led to a tragic impasse. resulting 
in the abandonment of the cycle. 
No doubt in undertaking this ambitious venture Sartre 
did not anticipate that this would happen. Thody (7) 
suggests that the reason for Sartre's abandonment of the 
series was largely a political one, that he probably 
intended to have the novel conclude with Mathieu freely 
committing himself to action within the collective 
discipline or a "truly democratic left-wing party", and with 
Brunet conquering his despair to Join him, but that by 1949 
such an ending was rendered impossible by Sartre•s own 
experience of political disillusionment (bitterly expressed 
perhaps as Brunet's in "Dzfole d'Amiti~"). 
Simone de Beauvoir in La Force des Chases (B) gives 
an outline of what was to have occurred in the final volume: 
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"starting, one from alienation in a cause, the other 
from an abstract freedom, Brunet and ~thieu both came to 
represent the authentic man of action as Sartre conceived 
him. Mathieu and Odette fell in love, she left Jacques, 
and they came to realize the fullness of a mutual passion. 
Arrested, Mathieu died under torture, heroic not by 
' ( 9) essence but because he had made himself into a hero •••• ' 
She claims the m$in reason why Sartre discontinued 
work on the fourth novel was that the main points had 
already been made and that all that remained for him was to 
"pick the fruits he had so carefully ripened," but by that 
time he was more interested in the present than in the past. 
Sartre himself has accounted for the incompletion of 
the series by saying that he came to regard the subject 
of a novel depicting the Resistance as artistically 
unsuitable. 
"The situation was too simple. I don't mean that it 
is simple to be courageous and risk one's life; what I 
mean is that the choice was too simple. One's allegiances 
were obvious •••• To write a novel whose hero dies in the 
Resistance, committed to the idea of liberty would be much 
too easy." (10) 
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However ttle matter is somewhat more complicated than 
Sartre allows. ~irstly I think Thody has a valid argument 
in putting forward a political interpretation as part of 
the cause of Sartre's failure to complete the tetralogy. 
Secondly, while writing the novels Sartre seems to have 
become trapped into certain philosophical difficulties 
which he had not anticipated at the outset. Cranston 
develops this line of th.ought i.n his chapter "sa:r.tre. 's 
Eth1cs ". 1~ which he points out that; 
"There is a profound contradiction in Sartre's 
moral theory; and by 1949. when be was supposed 
to be finishing Lea Chemins de la Liberte, he 
had reached a.point where he had either to 
confront this contradiction, and resolve it, or 
abandon any work which would oblige him to make 
an unambiguous statement of his ethical position." (11) 
The contradiction to which Cranston refers becomes 
apparent in terms of the human relationships depicted in 
the novels~ The possibility of such a contradiction 
arising had also been indic.ated in 1946 in L 'Existentialisme 
est un Human.isme where Sartre postulates that one ca,nnot 
aim for one's own freedom witho.ut taking into equal 
consideration the freedom of others, (12 ) yet be has 
previously reached the conclusion that recognition of the 
other's freedom' was beyond attainment. Certainly, Sartre 
later expressed his regret at the publication of this lecture. 
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I have drawn attention to the fact that the 
unsatisfactory relationships between the characters of 
the novels reflect the psychological conflict which Sartre, 
in L'Etre et le N{ant holds to be the basis of all 
relationships. Yet when he breaks off the novel sequence 
it is at the culmination of a relationship based on true 
mutual friendship of the very kind excluded by the theories 
he developed in his major philosophical treatise. The 
Brunet/Schneider relationship is elaborated with a great 
deal of sympathy and is certainly one of the more edifying 
aspects of La Mort dans l'Ame. Furthermore, an absolute 
value is placed on it and recognized by Brunet in a moment 
of truth when he holds his dying friend Vioarios and in an 
nabsolute of suffering" learns the meaning of despair as 
the relationship is severed. 
Sartre does not succeed in extricating his characters 
from the pessimistic dilemma in which they find themselves 
when life has confounded them. In La Mort dans l'Ame we 
are led to believe that Mathieu dies a futile death thinking 
that Liberty is Terror. After such a powerful climax to 
his story it seems unlikely to the reader that Sartre should 
plan to reveal later that Mathieu was not killed after all 
and allow him to re-ender the story to assert his freedom 
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authentically, Brunet too., who assumes a :role of promise 
after th~ disappea:rance of ~thieu trom the story, is left 
disillusioned and in a situation of despair from which 
there is no hint of his escaping when Sartre ceases writing. 
It seems that he has allowed his characters to have run up 
against a brick: wall of metaphysic a 1 pessimism and found 
their retreat closed off as well~ He shares their 
predicament s:ir1ne he has been unable in his novels to 
justify the absurdity of human life and activities. 
As well ao being an indication of his political and 
philosophical despair, Sartre's failure to finish Lea Chemins 
de la Libert-6 may $lao be attribute(~ in part to his 
limitations as a writer. The unhappy fact is that he has 
sacrifice(~ something of his talent as a novelist to his 
philosophical interests. As Iris Murdoch points out (13) 
he lacks the sympathy with the ordinary stuff of human 
life which characterizes the true novelist. Although 
there are instances where he successfully describes a moment 
in the life of ordinary people, especially in Le Sursis, 
such episodes are brief. His main characters are extreme 
cases representing the dilemmas of the intellectual, the 
Communist, the homosexual and so forth and although those 
problems are real they are specific and cannot be considered 
typical of everyday reality. Sartre shows very little 
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underst~nding of the kind of life which can and does 
exist beyond the world bounded by his philosophic beliefs. 
If an author deliberately sets out to express certain 
philosophical ideas he has., it is inevitable that he should 
manipulate the characters to some extent in order to 
illustrate these points. Sartre criticised Mauriac for 
not allowing the characters in his novels their "freedom" 
to develop, yet he himself might be accused of failing to 
achieve the illusion of permitting his characters an 
apparently autonomous existence. The difficulty is to 
create a balance in writing a novel propounding certain 
philosophical concepts and at the same time producing 
convincingly "real" characters. 
In his novels Sartre hoped to illustrate his beliefs 
and propose a solution :for certain political and philo-
sophioal problems. But, having reached a stage where he 
had, as Simone de Beauvoir suggests, covered the main 
points and had only to gather the carefully ripened fruits 
of his labour, or else had found the intended optimistic 
ending impossible to implement for political or philosophical 
reasons, he apparently was not sufficiently interested in 
his characters to complete the story, one way or another. 
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He has set aside his novel.at the poi.nt where the time 
was right for him to make a positive statE~ment about his 
concept of liberty as the salvation of the existential 
consc iousneas. He has throughout given a masterfully 
powerful analysis of the negative side or his thought. 
When the novel breaks off his characters are shown to have 
been defeated by life and in this situation or despair 
Sartre has left them. The pessimism has not been countered 
with optimism since he has not been able to achieve in his 
novels the expression of a genuine transition from negative 
to positive .. 
This is why his novels seem far more pessimistic than 
other of his works. In his philosophical w~itings the 
transition from negative despair to positive assertion of 
"rreedom" is more fully elaborated. From a literary view 
it appears that it is in the more constrained genre of the 
theatre than in the novel that Sartre has developed 
"existential heroes" who, although their situation is 
gloomy, seem at least to know the direction in which their 
salvation is to be found. But because in his novels he 
has depicted only the negative side of his existential 
doctrine and has not made the transition to a positive 
"road to freedom"., it is understandable that a great deal 
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of criticism has been levelled at Sartre on the score that 
his existential philosophy has bred a literature of despair. 
He is certainly acutely conscious of the tragic 
absurdity of the human condition but Sartre's so-called 
pessimism is neither discouraging nor cynical. On the 
contrary, his is a courageous and constructive belief in 
the value of the individual's freedom and in man's 
responsibility and capability of changing his own destiny. 
Despair may be the basic situation of the existentialist 
hero but having plumbed the darkest depths of absurdity 
and anxiety, having lost his illusions and found where 
his "freedom" lies he can then venture forth out of 
despair armed at least with a degree of confidence in 
himself. 
In the novels Sartre relentlessly depicts the ugliness 
and degradation of the human condition, it is true, and 
at times his intense realism seems atrocious. His use of 
interior monologue allows a cruelly detailed knowledge of 
the characters in their most banal or disgusting aspects. 
Sartre's characters are deliberately anti-heroic and the 
banality of the characters and existence which he has 
chosen to illustrate is reproduced with pitiless accuracy. 
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The consciousnesses of the characters, particularly of 
Roquentin and Mathieu, are revealed in all their 
transparency. Whether or not this conforms to artistic 
requirements is not always Sartre's concern. 
But the disgust and nausea which is the predominant 
mood of all the novels becomes a novelistic device self-
consciously exploited to uphold the claim that it is only 
in the face of the boredom and ugliness of existence that 
existential man assumes his dignity. The disgust is a 
temporary ascesis, a highly disturbing experience which 
jolts the selfish complacency of the consciousness and 
forces a total revision of values. 
In La Nausee Roquentin is acutely distressed at his 
disorientation in a world which has disintegrated into an 
unknown realm. In Les Chemins de la Liberte the constant 
self-analysis of the characters indicates their determina-
tion to escape futility and create a meaning in their 
lives. 
Sartre's narratives depict his heros~ quest to 
~ 
penetrate the depths of absurdity and despair i~his 
anxious attempt to discover the way out of despair in his 
~ 
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"chemin de la libertln. To face up to the threatening 
abyss of nothingness demands much courage and Sartre's 
concept of heroics is sternly uncompromising. Neither he 
nor his characters seek an easy escape from their unasked 
for burden or responsibilities. 
As regards the charge of morbidity, there can be no-
denying that Sartre's genius does have a strongly morbid 
element, but this morbidity has a certain potential to 
reveal truth and so is not without purpose. Certainly 
the picture of the world drawn in the novels is far from 
uplifting and many of the recurrent motifs - physical and 
metaphysical nausea, sadism, masochism, homosexuality, 
etc. - offer a depressing image of man. But such a 
picture is not contrived for the deliberate debasement 
and humiliation or man. Existential literature does not 
remain complacent towards the baser aspects of human 
nature. It does not advocate the passive acceptance of 
one's lower depths but a resolute assumption or one's 
duties to oneself and to others. 
Anguished questioning is the lot of the Sartrian 
character, vainly trying to explain an irrational universe 
and realizing that his existence is absurd. Nevertheless 
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he must recognize his imposed exile and resist it, in so 
far as he is able, by committing himself to the attempt, 
at least, of giving a sense to things. However trapped 
he may be in the viscous superfluity of his existence he 
still seeks some justification for that existence. 
Sartre is no idealist - he believes firmly in the 
reality of Evil. But despite the sordid squalor of the 
human condition as he sees it, he does not subside into 
passive nihilism. Such a view of humanity is not so 
entirely negative that no positive values can emerge from 
it, and Sartre believes that via the terrifying threat of 
Nothingness man comes to the affirmation of human freedom, 
as realized in committed action for the betterment of 
huxnan society. The reader of the novels is not so much 
depressed by man's apparently inescapable gloomy fate 
as he is anguished by the demand to assert his free choice 
and ~esponsibility in attempting a herculean task for 
which he will need all his courage since he alone must bear 
the burden, for he can conceive of no God to aid him. 
MUch of the bleakness of Sartre's existentialism 
must come from the fact that, not only does he no longer 
believe in traditional humanist concepts, but also that he 
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does not possess the comfort of a transcendental, religious 
belief either. Sartre's atheism is undeniably sombre. 
Accepting Nietzsche's claim that "God is dead" Sartre must 
then draw the, to him, inevitable conclusion that, in a 
universe abandoned by God, man is absurd and unjustified, 
as is Being itself. 
William Barrett in his book Irrational Man, states 
that: "sartre is the Cartesian doubter at a different 
place and time", (14 ) and likens his approach to Descartes' 
method of systematic doubt. But unlike Descartes, whose 
Catholic, Cristian belief and his concept of a structured 
system of essences preceding existence were to prove his 
salvation from the threat of Nothingness, Sartre, the 
atheist existentialist, must remain in the anguish of the 
void. Cartesian doubt reveals man's liberty as subject to 
God's liberty but if God is no longer acknowledged man's 
liberty becomes total and absolute, and proportionately 
more anguished. Thus man is accorded the position vacated 
by God., By his acts alone shall he create his own essence 
and by fully acknowledging his duties to himself and to 
others shall he achieve the difficult assumption of his 
tota 1 freedomo In the absence of God existentialism offers 
an alternative which is stoical, but optimistic rather 
than apathetic or pessimistic. 
Since for Sartre death is the end from which there 
is no resurrection, he is rejecting any sort of "hope" which 
Christianity might offer, just as he rejects other 
delusions, notably those of the traditional humanisms, by which 
man may be tempted to forget the responsibilities of his 
existence which he must assume. Sartre is writing 
specifically for the needs of his time as he sees them and 
believes that man may find within himself the courage to 
face the inevitability of death, despite having lost the 
comfort of religious belief. In his affirmation of the 
preciousness of the individual's freedom and the possibility 
of a free society which has shed the fetters of both 
bourgeois materialism and a too restrictive communism, 
Sartre offers to the generation which follows him a concept 
of social solidarity in which human life truly begins "on 
the other side of despair". 
Admittedly his concept of freedom, as we have seen, 
brings its dilemmas and bas apparently led him to an 
impasse which cannot be resolved without a substantial 
re-assessment'of his committed stand. For Sartre however 
a "desperate hope" does not seem a contradiction in terms. 
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His fiction may be laden with intellectual anguish but his 
negation is not cynicism. Subsequent to the terrifying 
descent into the depths of despair the existentialists offer 
to reconstruct something of man's former dignity and 
nobility; they have the courage and determination to 
destroy in order to build again on firmer foundations. 
Human dignity and freedom are to be found "a 1 'autre cot~ 
du de'sespoir". It is regrettable that Les Chemins de la 
Libert~ was abandonned before its characters had reached 
this "other side•. 
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CONCLUSION 
SARTRE: NOVELIST AND PHILOSOPHER 
After a study of the close relationship between th~ 
themes of Sartre's existential philosophy and those of his 
fiction, the question arises as to the advisability of 
such a combination of novelist and philosopher. 
Existentialism although primarily a philosophic movement, 
has played a significant role in the literary history of 
this century by uniting contemporary philosophy with a 
literary expression, and among its ranks are to be found 
such reputable novelists as Albert Camus and Simone de 
Beauvoir. Although Sartre too, in terms of chronology at 
least, seams to have been instinctively drawn to the 
novelistic medium, he is an altogether more self-consciously 
"existential" novelist. His case is the more particular 
since he is virtually a professional philosopher who has 
used the novel form (and the dramatic form too for that 
matter) to give expression to his philosophic ideas. 
In previous pages we have noted the general tendency 
of the novel this century to become increasingly pre• 
occupied with what might broadly be termed "metaphysics". 
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In 1947 Sartre wrote: "We are Jansenists because our age 
has made us thus, and since it hasforced us to explore our 
own limits, I would say that we are all metaphysical 
writers." (1 ) 
Philosophy and the art of the novelist would seem at 
first to be two separate entities, each with character-
istics apparently contradictory to or incompatible with 
the other. Philosophic writings are analytical, attempting 
to give an account of life in general terms of ideas and 
abstractions. The realm of the novel on the other hand 
is one of action depicted within a particularized reality. 
Whereas a philosophic work is concerned with abstractions 
and generalities, the novel is traditionally concerned 
with individuals and their acts. Of course in so far as 
the novel does deal with individuals it is also concerned 
with human values in a more general sense and a certain 
maturity of moral outlook is to be expected of the 
competent novelist in his treatment of these values. 
By his selection and arrangement of his material in such 
a way that it must reflect his own "Weltanschauung", the 
novelist endows his fiction with a moral significance. In 
this limited sense then, the novel genre and philosophy 
do have a common point of contact. 
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However, the traditional mainstays of the novel are 
undeniably character and action (or plot). It is the 
novelist's task to "present" character and experience, not 
to analyse them intellectually. That is the philosopher's 
concern. The novelist may draw c~nclusions of course, 
he may even go so far as to pass Judgement upon the 
characters he has created, but this is usually done 
implicitly, not explicitly. For if the intellectual 
structure of a novel is too obvious the work suffers in 
terms of art and is reduced to a mere "roman a these" .. 
A true novel must contain therefore, certain essentials 
which could not be replaced by a philosophical treatise. 
John Cruickshank observes in his introduction to 
The Novelist as Philosopher: "This distinction between 
the presentation of experience by the novelist and its 
analysis by the philosopher explains the widespread 
• critical resistance, so often justified, to metaphysical 
fiction. 11 ( 2 ) 
To the French reading public however, the concept 
of the metaphysical novel may not be so unnatural as it 
appears to the English (or American) m~nd. Henri Peyre 
in the Contemporary French Novel (3) notes that the term 
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'moraliste" (only inadequately translated by the English 
~moralist") is applied with pride to French novelists by 
their compatriots. They expect fiction to offer moral 
instruction and that literature should have a metaphysical 
justification is quite acceptable to them. Subsequently 
Peyre observes that in French literary history there are 
several examples of occasions when the prevailing 
philosphical mood has entered the fields of contemporary 
literature to the advantage of both, and cites Bergsonism, 
the Age of Enlightenment, and Cartesianism, as specific 
instances. Existentialism is likely to be acknowledged 
as equally influential on literary history and the 
nove1ist writing for a contemporary public has much to 
gain by broaching in his fiction the moral and metaphysical 
problems which beset the age, providing of course that he 
does not do so at the expense of artistry. If a novelist 
is to combine, as Sartre does, presentation of experience 
with obvious intellectual analysis, it must be achieved 
with careful balance if the result is not to cause the 
reader an uneasy sense of a hybrid genre. 
There has been much critical speculation about Sartre 
as to which came first - the novelist or the philosopher, 
and indeed there is sufficient evidence to support either 
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opinion. Simone de Beauvoir notes that fiction holds a 
particular attraction for the existentialist since "only 
the novel allows a writer to evoke the original 
njaillissement" of existence". ( 4 ) If this is the case it 
is not surprising that Sartre should have first become 
known as a novelist. 
If we examine the dates of his writings we see that 
he appears to have been drawn first to fiction. We 
have his own testimony in Les Mots to the fact that even 
as a child Sartre had a passion for scribbling down his 
versions of stories he had read. In his adolescence he 
wrote a novel, D6faite, which was unpublished and 
subsequently destroyed, and L'Ange du Mor~ was the 
title of an early short story. Of his better known works 
the short story collection, LeMur (1937-1939), and his 
first published novel, La Nau~e (1938), both appeared 
before L'Etre et le Neant, the major statement of his 
philosophy which was published in 1943. So in terms of 
the chronology of his writings Sartre seems to have been 
a literary artist before a philosophic writer. In the 
meantime of course he had received a formal training in 
philosophies, and Simone de Beauvoir testifies to his 
interest in the works of Heidegger in the late 30's. Also 
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he had written two relatively minor philosophical works, 
~'Imagination (1936) and L'Imaginaire (1940), which preceded 
L'Etre et le Neant but dealt only with limited aspects of 
his thought. 
The first two volumes of the novel cycle Lea Chemins 
de la Liberti, L'Age de Raison and Le Surais, appeared in 
1945 and the third volume, La Mort dans 1 1Ame was published 
in 1949. In the same year two chapters of the fourth and 
final volume, La Derniere Chance, appeared in Lea Temps 
Moder~, but since that time Sartre has neglected fiction 
entirely in favour of drama, literary criticism, and 
further elaboration of his philosophical and political 
ideas in numerous articles. His novel sequence remains 
unfinished and it seems unlikely at this stage that Sartre 
will ever complete the final volume. 
In view of his complete abandonment of the genre at 
the age of forty-four, having wtitten only four novels, it 
is reasonable to suppose that Sartre first and foremost 
always was and always will be a philosopher. Since his 
novels are all, to a greater or lesser extent, incarnations 
of his philosophy, his claim to fame as a novelist lies 
in his talent for transferring his ideas to characters 
and images of a narrative form. 
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For Sartre creative writing is not a diversion from 
his philosophic writing - it is a different method of 
expounding the same theories. This approach to his role 
as a novelist is the basis of many of the objections which 
critics have raised with regard to Sartre's no~els. Sartre 
could be accused of reporting experience out of a previous 
philosophical commitment and thereby jeopardizing the 
validity of the artist's testimony which should not be 
biased by intellectual preconceptions. And since his 
philosophy rejects the transcendental values which are 
expected in any truly artistic medium, his novels may 
appear too restricted. Sartre 's theorles of a "li tterature 
engagee" indicate that what he demands of art is basically 
a means of analysis from which to derive moral recommenda-
tions. The novel form is particularly suitable for such 
an interpretation since it is a direct reflection of and a 
commentary upon the human condition. It is also a 
literary medium of expression with extensive influence 
and Sartre is fully aware of its potential in spreading 
his philosophy. However, care is needed to ensure 
that the novel does not become merely a vehicle for 
propaganda since to use prose in this way is to deny its 
creative function. 
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Some critics have claimed that Sartre's fictional 
wot:~ks are merely illustrations of his philosophy, implying 
that he lacks a literary imagination, but Sartre 's type of 
philosophy is not incompatible with literary expression. 
As an existentialist he is concerned with individuals 
in terms of their awareness of themselves and others. 
As a phenomena logical thinker he attempts to grasp the 
reality of situations in their totality. This attempt to 
seize the particularity of existence in terms of 
contemporary reality is close to a literary approach which 
also deals with particular cases in particular circumstances. 
From Sartre's point of view there is no rigid division 
between the two activities of writing philosophy and 
writing existential novels. He has certainly fulfilled -
himself as a "litterateur" with his novels, plays, short 
stories, and literary essays, although he is also the most 
intellectualistic of the existential~sts in his philosophy. 
Simone de Beauvoir in her essay Li tterature et 
~taphysique suggests that a philosopher who is primarily 
concerned with subjectivity and temporality is almost sure 
to become a literary artist. But the idea always remains 
supreme for Sartre and his response is intellectual rather 
than artistic. 
Nevertheless he has a considerable talent for handling 
the technicalities of novel-writing. particularly in his 
masterful use of language. The irrelevancies which can 
sometimes mar lengthy interior monologues have been 
reduced to a minimum and the dialogues have a naturalness 
ana vigour which testifies to Sartre's skill as a dramatic 
writer. A certain horrid beauty is to be found in 
descriptions in La Nause'e of physical objects - the pebble, 
the tramseat, the tree-root.~~ - at the moment when 
Roquentin suddenly experiences the full realization of 
their existence, and in Les Chemins de la Libert{. scenes 
like Mathieu's final outburst of self-declaration from 
the tower and the death of Vicarios are not without 
passionate intensity. But despite the eloquence of his 
prose. Sartre more often than not lacks the conviction of 
the true artiat. His most successful passages have nothing 
of conventional beauty and 1t is this absence of the poet. 
in the tradi tiona 1 semse which constitutes a rna jor 
deficiency in Sartre as a creative writer. The nauseating 
superfluity of existence fascinates him and he describes 
perhaps too faithfully its horrors and absur•dities. These 
are paradoxes in an artistic temperament which one naturally 
expects to have an optimistic confidence in life and 
humanity. Sartre rejects the transcendental, positive 
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values and any notion of a natural benevolence which sooner 
or later even the most melancholy poet seems to find. 
One cannot help feeling therefore that if Sartre were a 
true poet and artist his philosophy would have been 
considerably different. 
With these observations in mind, plus the evidence of 
Sartre's abandonment of the novel genre, it is reasonable 
to assume that he is more of a philosopher than a novelist, 
and that the period of time, extending just over a decade, 
during which his novels were written was but one stage of 
several in his writing career. But it is an important 
stage and it is significant that his philosophy should have 
first been presented in imaginative form in La Naus~e. It 
could be held that by writing this creative work of fict.ton 
Sartre obtained a grasp of reality which enabled him to 
clarify in his own mind the concepts of the philosophy he 
was later to formulate and develop intellectually in 
L 1Etre et le Neant. 
La Naus(e is the most successful of Sartre's novels 
since it is the one where the creative writer and the 
intellectual philosopher are most closely united. This is 
perhaps the most purely "philosophical" of his novels, yet 
the concepts and ideas which play such a major role in the 
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novel ar~ invested with a vitality and a sense of necessitJ 
which integrates them with Roquentin's experience •. Sartre 
appears to have applied himself more assiduously to his 
task as a novelist and for this reason La Nausee has 
considerably more literary metit than his later novels. 
After writing La Nause'e, the imaginative manifesto, 
and L'Etre et le N~ant, the intellectual manifesto of his 
Existentialism, Sartre seems to have been influenced more 
consciously by his philosophy in his subsequent fictional 
work .. 
Considering the promise of his first novel the three 
volumes of Les Chemins de la Liberte are somewhat 
disappointing. As individual novels and as a series, 
there is an uneveness in their quality. When he employs the 
technique of simultaneity, which granted has its advantages, 
there is sometimes an uncomfortable sense either of 
experimentation or else a display of purely technical 
virtuosity. Many of the passages of description and 
dialogue are little short of brilliant in their impact 
but the series as a whole does not reach the same level 
of merit as La Nause'e. The integration and intensity of 
the latter is lacking although this is partly to be expected 
since a novel cycle deals with a far wider range of 
characters and subjects. It seems that Sartre is now 
more self-consciously describing experiences based on 
the philosophic assumptions he has evolved and paying less 
attention to the finer points of the novelist's art. 
There are instances in Les Chemins de la Libert€ where 
the transmutation of ideas. necessary if philosophy is to be 
combined successfully with literature. is not always 
achieved. The intention of illustrating rather than 
expounding his philosophy in the series is not easy to 
accomplish and hence a certain inconsistency. To quote 
Iris Murdoch in her book Sartre: Romantic Rationalist: 
nHis inability to write a great novel is a 
tragic symptom of a situation which afflicts 
us all. We know that the real lesson to be 
taught is that the human person is precious 
and unique; but we seem unable to set it forth 
except in terms of ideology and abstraction." (6) 
The main reason why the series is a comparative 
failure is its unrelieved pessimism. It reaches a state 
of thematic frustration, apparently because the philosophy 
of freedom around which it centres is defective. The 
problems of the will to action and the assumption of 
freedom by the individual finds no satisfactory solution and 
Sartre 's abandonment of the se:ties before its completion 
seems to indicate his inability to describe in fictional 
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terms the positive side of his philosophy which leads away 
from despair and pessimism. It would certainly have been 
Sartre's intention that the f1nal volume, had it been 
written would have resolved these difficulties. That he 
will ever complete it now is unlikely, if not impossible, 
and Les Chemins de la Libert' will remain as an uneven 
testimony on Sartre's ability as a novelist, his philosophy, 
and his time. 
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